NATO and forward defense an analysis of expeditionary capabilities and out-of-area-security by Kramer, Bryan K.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2005-06
NATO and forward defense an analysis of
expeditionary capabilities and out-of-area-security
Kramer, Bryan K.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
NATO AND FORWARD DEFENSE:  AN ANALYSIS OF  










 Thesis Advisors:   Hans-Eberhard Peters 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 
0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2005 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  NATO and Forward Defense: An Analysis of 
Expeditionary Capabilities and Cooperative Security 
6. AUTHOR(S) Bryan Kramer 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8.PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This thesis examines the NATO’s adaptation of a new security focus towards forward defense in the 21st Century.   
Until the late 1990’s, the strategic focus of NATO was on mutual defense based on a collective response guaranteed 
by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.  Since the adoption of NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999), the Alliance has shifted their 
strategic focus toward a forward defense strategy.  As NATO assumed more operational responsibilities, and deployed forces 
out-of-area in non-Article 5 missions, the disparity of military capabilities, operational challenges, and cultural and institutional 
differences within the Alliance gave rise to the question, “Is NATO the most effective instrument with which to execute a 
strategy of forward defense?”   
A review of the expeditionary campaigns in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq determines the efficiency of the 
Alliance as an expeditionary security actor.  The modernization of European military capabilities are described in relation to 
NATO, and how these programs either complement or duplicate existing structures and capabilities.  Furthermore, inherent 
structural flaws in NATO’s composition are examined, as well as cultural and ideological differences within the Alliance and 
their effects on out-of-area operations. Finally, challenges and issues that may confront NATO in the future during the 
execution of their forward defense strategy are discussed.  
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
135 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  NATO, non-Article 5 missions, forward security, out-of-area intervention, 
transformation, military capabilities, National Security Strategy, European Security Strategy, 
European Union, ESDP 



















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
NATO AND FORWARD DEFENSE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF  




Bryan K. Kramer 
Major, United States Marine Corps 
B.A., Pepperdine University, 1985 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 











Author:  Bryan K. Kramer 
 
 
Approved by:  Hans-Eberhard Peters 






































This thesis examines the NATO’s adaptation of a new security focus towards 
forward defense in the 21st Century.   
Until the late 1990’s, the strategic focus of NATO was on mutual defense based 
on a collective response guaranteed by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.  Since the 
adoption of NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999), the Alliance has shifted their strategic 
focus toward a forward defense strategy.  As NATO assumed more operational 
responsibilities, and deployed forces out-of-area in non-Article 5 missions, the disparity 
of military capabilities, operational challenges, and cultural and institutional differences 
within the Alliance gave rise to the question, “Is NATO the most effective instrument 
with which to execute a strategy of forward defense?”   
A review of the expeditionary campaigns in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq 
determines the efficiency of the Alliance as an expeditionary security actor.  The 
modernization of European military capabilities are described in relation to NATO, and 
how these programs either complement or duplicate existing structures and capabilities.  
Furthermore, inherent structural flaws in NATO’s composition are examined, as well as 
cultural and ideological differences within the Alliance and their effects on out-of-area 
operations. Finally, challenges and issues that may confront NATO in the future during 


































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii




II. NATO 1989 – 2001: A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY - STRONG 
CONCEPTS, WEAK METHODS AND INSUFFICIENT CAPABILITIES.........5 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................5 
B. DEFINING THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT.............................................................................................7 
1. NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept.........................................................9 
2. Bosnia and Failure of Diplomatic Methods to Prevent Conflict 
(1991-1995)..........................................................................................11 
3. Developing a European Security and Defense Identity (1992- 
1998) ....................................................................................................13 
C. IMPLEMENTING THE OUT-OF AREA FOCUS TOWARDS NATO 
SECURITY STRATEGY..............................................................................17 
1. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept.......................................................18 
2. Kosovo and the Lack of a Credible Military Response in 
Europe (1995 – 1999) .........................................................................20 
3. Operational Limitations and a Disparity of Focus and Purpose 
in NATO..............................................................................................22 
D. NATO’S FALSE SECURITY: A VULNERABLE DEPENDENCY ........24 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................26 
III. NATO 2001 – 2002: AN UNDERUTILIZED POTENTIAL - COLLECTIVE 
SECURITY VS. UNILATERALISM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH ...................29 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................29 
B. NATO INTERVENES: AN “OUT-OF AREA” RESPONSE UNDER 
ARTICLE 5 ....................................................................................................30 
1. September 11th and the Invocation of Article 5...............................31 
2. Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security 
Assistance Force (2001 – 2003) .........................................................32 
C. EUROPE’S COMMITMENT TO EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY...36 
1. The NATO Prague Summit, the Prague Capabilities 
Commitment and NATO Transformation (2002 - 2003)................36 
2. European Security and Defense Policy: Developing an “Out-of 
Area” Capability within the Europe Union (2001 – 2003) .............40 
D. “COWBOY DIPLOMACY”: THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROAD TO 
IRAQ ...............................................................................................................43 
1. The Ideology of the National Security Strategy ..............................43 
2. Europe Strong-armed:  Between Submission and Resistance .......45 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................46 
IV. NATO 2002 – 2003:  THE TRANSATLANTIC RIFT -  THE IRAQ WAR 
AND THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WITHIN “OLD EUROPE” ...............49 
 viii
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................49 
B. IDEOLOGY BECOMES FOREIGN POLICY:  IMPLEMENTING 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY..............................................51 
1. The “Wolfowitz Doctrine” ................................................................53 
2. A Clash of Cultures............................................................................54 
3. Impasse in the United Nations: The European Resistance 
Movement Builds (2002 – 2003)........................................................55 
C. REGIME CHANGE AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE:  
INEFFECTIVE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS, A DIVIDED 
EUROPE, AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RIFT.......................................56 
1. The United States Disregards the Security Council........................57 
2. Friction Permeates NATO (2002 – 2003).........................................58 
D. THE EFFECTS OF UNILATERALISM:  INVASION, 
INTRANSIGENCE AND INSURGENCY (2003 – 2004) ..........................60 
1. Difficulties in Post-Conflict Stabilization and Installing 
Democracy ..........................................................................................60 
2. The Toll of the Occupation on U.S. Capabilities.............................61 
E. THE COSTS OF UNILATERALISM:  DAMAGE TO 
MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION AND U.S. CREDIBILITY 
(2003 – 2004)...................................................................................................64 
1. Strategic Effects of the Madrid Bombings (March – July 2004) ...64 
2. NATO Stymied:  Continuing Discord Prevents a Substantial 
Out-of-Area Role for the Alliance ....................................................67 
F. EUROPE EMERGES FROM DISCORD A NEWLY FOCUSED 
SECURITY ACTOR .....................................................................................68 
1. Europe Asunder and Reconciled ......................................................69 
2. Defining European’s Vision: The European Security Strategy 
(2003)...................................................................................................71 
G. CONCLUSION:  THE ROAD TO ISTANBUL (2004) ..............................74 
V. NATO 2004 – PRESENT:  ISTANBUL AND BEYOND - THE FUTURE OF 
TRANSATLANTIC OUT-OF-AREA COOPERATION ......................................77 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................77 
B. THE ISTANBUL SUMMIT (JUNE 2004)...................................................78 
1. Commitment to Cooperation, Transformation and Forward 
Defense ................................................................................................78 
2. Continued Involvement Out-of Area for Forward Defense...........79 
3. The Middle East Peace Process, the Mediterranean Dialogue 
and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative...........................................80 
C. BEYOND ISTANBUL: NATO OUT-OF-AREA ENGAGEMENTS .......81 
1. NATO’s Afghanistan Mission Continues to Expand......................82 
2. “NATO in Palestine?” .......................................................................82 
3. NATO’s Response Force becomes Operational ..............................83 
4. NATO’s Training Mission in Iraq (2004 – 2005) ............................84 
D. THE EUROPEAN UNION: A LEGITIMATE SECURITY ACTOR......85 
1. EU Stability Operations ....................................................................86 
 ix
2. Battle Groups .....................................................................................86 
E. ANALYSIS: THE INEVITABILITY OF THE TRANSATLANTIC 
RIFT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AS AN OUT-OF-
AREA SECURITY ACTOR .........................................................................88 
1. NATO will Function Despite Its Inherent Flaws ............................89 
2. The EU will Compete with, but not Replace NATO.......................91 
3. Unilateralism has Run Its Course, at Least in the Current U.S. 
Administration (2005)........................................................................97 
4. Institutional, Cultural and Ideological Differences Remain in 
the Alliance and will Impact NATO’s Operations..........................99 
5. For NATO to Assume a Leading Role as an Expeditionary 
Security Actor It Must be able to Conduct Rapid Response .......102 
F. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................103 
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................105 
BIBLIOGRAPHY:...............................................................................................................107 




























I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the numerous individuals who 
provided exceptional guidance, motivation, and support during the creation of this work.  
As a culminating effort of a hard, yet brief, time at NPS, I hope that this effort stands not 
as the final result, but as the beginning of a path towards new cultural and institutional 
understanding and awareness that will be utilized to its fullest potential in both the 
military and international community.  Also, I would like to express my gratitude to the 
United States Marine Corps for the priceless opportunity to attend The Naval 
Postgraduate School - an exceptional educational and security institution.  In addition, I 
would like to thank the following individuals: 
To Col. Hans-Eberhard Peters; my appreciation for awakening in me an 
appreciation of the international community, holding an unparalleled military officer 
forum, for creating a “Europeanist”, and for providing exceptional information, guidance, 
patience and focus during the production of this thesis.   
To Dr. Donald Abenheim; my gratitude for unleashing the skeptical critic within 
me, for the recognition of the dangers inherent in ideology in all its forms, and for 
inspiring a passionate, and at times skeptical, view of historic events, in an attempt to 
view our future through the patterns that history suggests. 
To Dora Martinez, whose persistent determination and consistent professionalism 
in an underappreciated responsibility kept the excruciating administrative minutia under 
control, and allowed students such as myself to focus on our mission, purpose and goal at 
NPS.  Sometimes the greatest endeavors are right in front of you.  
Finally, and most importantly, to my wife, Stefanie; though words could never 
fully express the appreciation I feel for your courage, dedication and sacrifice.  You have 
been my rock, my muse and my mentor in this endeavor.  Thank you for the purpose, 
strength, dedication and above all, the love you have freely given to me through it all.  I 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Alliance is no longer the static organization of the Cold War.  In fact, 
the very moment the Cold War ended, that old NATO ceased to exist. 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, February 24 2005 
From 1989 to 2005, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would experience a 
period of unprecedented changes and challenges.  Having accomplished their established 
mission with the demise of the Soviet Union and the absorption of the Warsaw pact 
nations, NATO would undergo a complete transformation of their purpose in order to 
remain a relevant international security institution.  Within this time NATO would evolve 
from a static, defensive collective security organization ensured by Article 5 of the 1949 
Washington Treaty, to one that focused on out-of-area interventions, utilizing 
expeditionary military capabilities with a strategy of forward defense.    
NATO’s new approach to security after the end of the Cold War is based upon 
three pillars.  The first element is the undertaking of operations to deal with security risks 
at their source, before they emerge.  The second is the need for new military capabilities. 
The final element is the requirement for stronger cooperation among the nations within 
the Alliance and among others.1 All of these elements are now interrelated in NATO’s 
out-of-area, forward security strategy, and all would be severely tested as the Alliance 
implemented this approach in historic interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
As NATO assumed more operational responsibilities, and deployed forces out-of-
area in non-Article 5 missions, the disparity of military capabilities, operational 
challenges, and cultural and institutional differences within the Alliance gave rise to the 
question, “Is NATO the most effective instrument with which to execute a strategy of 
forward defense?”   This  question  will  be  the  focus  of  the  thesis.  The  answer to this  
 
 
                                                 
1 NATO, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: The successor generation, Deputy Secretary 
General’s Key Note Address, Royal United Services Institute, Conference, London, November 29 2004, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041129a.htm accessed 15 May 2005 
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question is, “NATO is the premiere international security institution with which to 
execute out-of-area interventions, and should be utilized as such in a forward defense 
strategy.” 
This argument will come from an analysis of NATO’s out-of-area interventions to 
date; Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.  It will be argued that the institution suffered 
during these interventions from conflicting national caveats of the contributing nations, 
has a dysfunctional operational command structure during combat, and contains a 
disparity of military capabilities among its members.  Subsequently, it will be argued that 
the Alliance has been successful in the difficult process of promoting and establishing 
peace and stability in those regions in which it has intervened. 
By further examining NATO’s out-of-area engagements, an analysis of these 
interventions will demonstrate that these strategic and operational shortfalls were 
manifested because the Alliance did not have experience in expeditionary engagements.  
Furthermore, the culture of the Alliance contained a predominate resistance to the use of 
military force in the conduct of foreign policy.  Upon further examination, it will be 
demonstrated that, not only has the Alliance overcome this aversion, but as in the case of 
the Iraq invasion, has suffered the adverse consequences of an interventionist foreign 
policy      
Also, the agreements and commitments adopted and implemented during this time 
now provide NATO with a dedicated military capability with which to conduct 
expeditionary operations.  As NATO implements the structures, capabilities and 
organizations that were identified as deficient in their initial campaigns in the Balkans, 
the Alliance will have the military means as well as the institutional focus to implement 
forward defense. 
The role of the European Union and the European Security and Defense Policy 
will be reviewed concurrently with NATO developments.  The development and 
modernization of European military forces and the progression of the EU as a legitimate 
security actor could appear to make NATO redundant.  Under analysis, the role of ESDP 
will be to complement, not compete with the Alliance in European security, especially in 
a forward defense strategy.  As the EU assumed a more active role in the European 
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security issues, their efforts under the ESDP would promote further improvements in 
Europe’s military capabilities and the assumption of greater out-of-area security 
responsibilities.    These progressions would provide more professional and interoperable 
capabilities to NATO campaigns, as well as provide strategic options and operational 
support. 
The further argument will involve an appreciation of U.S. unilateralist foreign 
policy and its repercussions in Europe and the Alliance.  While the United States was 
able to quickly and efficiently remove the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
installing functioning democratic institutions in these countries will be a more 
challenging and long-term endeavor.  Conducting a long-term stabilization mission 
requires prolonged sustainment, and has been a mission that NATO has excelled.  It will 
be argued that utilizing existing multinational security institutions for providing 
peacekeepers in the stability phase of an out-of-area intervention is an unparalleled 
strength of such organizations.  Consistent support from ad hoc coalition members will 
dwindle during prolonged engagements, and put a severe strain on the resources and 
capabilities of unilateral actors.   
What makes NATO an effective out-of-area security actor is not its new ability to 
fight wars, nor its history of establishing peace.  What will define NATO as such is the 
ability to do both.  All that remains is for the member nations of the Alliance to utilize the 
institution in such a capacity.  This will constitute an additional argument of the thesis.  
The inherent weaknesses in the structures of the Alliance resulted in the transatlantic rift 
in protest of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.   
While the Alliance has functioned via consensus, no mechanisms existed to 
prevent unilateral action, or the blocking effects of a few self-interested members.  
Examination of the transatlantic rift will demonstrate that, while the costs of protesting 
unilateral action are significant, the costs of conducting it are enormous. Therefore, it is 
not an option available to all, or to be taken lightly, or that can be repeated frequently.  
When the members aligned in support or protest of U.S. foreign policy in Iraq, this 
polarization demonstrated that unilateralism was more expensive than working within the 
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restrictions of a multilateral institution.  Thus, the rift would be inevitable because there 
had not been a significant demonstration of the costs of “opting out.”   
The final argument of the thesis will be that the inherent flaws of the Alliance still 
exist, but in the current security environment, these shortfalls will be able to be managed 
and overcome.  At the Istanbul Summit, the Allies were very cooperative, and renewed 
measures towards continuing transformation and expanding out-of-area engagements.  
The reasons for this cooperation are: the threat is too great for the Alliance to remain 
divided, and the costs are too great to bear alone.  
NATO’s continued relevance in forward defense of a new type is directly related 
to the desire of the member nations to utilize NATO as a crisis management and conflict 
prevention institution; in the organization’s ability to carry out the requirements of the 
mission, and in the   capabilities and structure/operational ability of the military forces of 
the member nations.  Therefore, the Alliance will persevere because the Allies need each 
other.  It will be due to these reasons that the Allies will utilize NATO as the premiere 
security institution in a strategy based on forward defense.  Such a goal shall continue to 
be in their best interests.   
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II. NATO 1989 – 2001: A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY - 
STRONG CONCEPTS, WEAK METHODS AND INSUFFICIENT 
CAPABILITIES  
The Alliance has evolved from a passive, reactive defense organization 
into one that is actively building security right across Europe. 
General Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, 1999 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Between the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the collapse of the World Trade 
Center (2001), NATO began its first tentative steps towards dealing with the myriad of 
security threats that rose to prominence in the aftermath of the bi-polar super-power 
confrontation that had been the focus of the world’s concern for generations.  The initial 
relief over NATO’s triumph over the Warsaw Pact soon gave way to the realization that 
the methods that had proven successful in deterring Soviet expansion into Western 
Europe would not prove as effective in dealing with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), Humanitarian Crisis, conflicts inspired by ethnically-based 
Nationalism, and the goals of transnational terrorist organizations that threatened Europe 
from their periphery.  In order to maintain its relevance as a security institution, NATO 
would have to adapt their collective strategic concept as well as transform the military 
capabilities of the member nations in order to address these new and emerging security 
issues. While NATO’s European Allies would display competence and willingness in the 
former, they would prove reluctant, hesitant and non-committal in accomplishing the 
later. 
The purpose of this chapter is to define the shift of NATO’s strategic focus from 
collective defense to out-of-area engagement and involvement from 1989 to 2001.  
During this time, NATO strove to define the post-Cold War security environment 
through the publications of Strategic Concepts first in 1991 and later in 1999.  NATO’s 
Strategic Concepts identified the new and emerging security threats as well as the 
methods and capabilities that would provide the best recourse and protection against 
them.  A key realization that will be analyzed is that during this period, NATO’s 
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diplomatic methods and military capabilities that prevented and/or deterred a super-
power confrontation on the European continent were no longer as effective, or in some 
cases non-applicable, in the modern new security environment or in dealing with the new 
and emerging threats on Europe’s periphery. The inapplicability of Cold War concepts 
would be painfully demonstrated in the Balkans conflicts of the 1990’s.  As NATO 
executed their first combat and peacekeeping operations, the institution’s role and 
existence would be questioned due to the hesitancy of the European Allies to utilize force 
as a method of foreign policy and the lack of capability to do so once a military course of 
action had been decided upon.  NATO would also be hampered as much by design as by 
opposition due to the complexity of the multinational decision making process among an 
alliance of unequal contributors. 
Within this time, NATO’s Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999 would propose 
decreased dependence upon nuclear weapons, and would emphasize cooperation with 
former adversaries as opposed to confrontation.  NATO’s Strategic Concept would 
further call for an increased reliance upon smaller, professional and flexible military 
forces, which would contain the essence of the transformation and modernization of 
European military capabilities and would encourage the development of a European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.  Also, this chapter will define 
the development and recognition of new and emerging security threats and the new 
concepts and doctrine that were proposed to address them within these summit meetings.  
Finally, this chapter will analyze the issues and challenges of adapting and utilizing these 
concepts during NATO’s intervention in the Balkans conflicts, as the institution was not 
only burdened by methods and doctrines more applicable to Cold War deterrence than 
crisis response, but by a lack of political will and military capability, the design and 
complexity of the multinational decision making process, and divergent philosophies of 
conflict resolution and crisis management. This divergence would foreshadow a 
weakness in the alliance and a growing rift in the transatlantic relationship as the US and 
Europe developed, promoted and eventually adopted different methods of resolving 
conflict and crisis management.    
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B. DEFINING THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT 
From 1949-1989, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was primarily 
concerned with providing political, strategic, and military cohesion in a balance of power 
alliance against the threat of Soviet expansion and NATO’s communist counterpart in the 
east, the Warsaw Pact.  Changes in NATO’s strategic concept and the very nature of the 
alliance itself were precipitated by the collapse of communism and the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.  The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat that was the principle 
concern of the Alliance in its first forty years had disappeared.2  On the heels of success, 
NATO underwent a significant adaptation as a collective security alliance based upon 
Cold War concepts of deterrence, balance of power and a defensive strategy that would 
likely disintegrate in the absence of an obvious threat such as that posed by the Warsaw 
Pact.     
Throughout the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, and the reunification of 
Germany, NATO played a key diplomatic and political role.  The collapse of communism 
in Eastern Europe resulted in significant NATO enlargement, with the majority of 
Warsaw Pact nations seeking membership into, or cooperation with NATO in one form 
or another.  These mechanisms would be achieved either through membership ascension 
such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, or initiatives such as Partnership for 
Peace (1994), The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (1997), the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission (2000), and the NATO-Russia Council of 2002.3   In this environment, 
NATO’s new role became one of promoting cohesion, unity, and enlargement and 
promised to promote the adoption of the alliance’s essential and enduring purpose: 
Maintenance of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe based on common values of 
democracy, human rights and rule of law.4  This central alliance remained the governing 
principle in achieving a greater, unified Europe that now includes former enemies in 
                                                 
2 NATO Strategic Concept 1991, NATO Ministerial Communiqués, NATO On-line Library, Part 1, 
par. 5,  http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm accessed 28 April 2005 
3 NATO Handbook, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, Belgium, 2001, 80-90. 
4 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 1949, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm 
accessed 28 April 2005. 
 8
multiple economic, political and security institutions.  All the countries that were 
formerly adversaries of NATO had dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological 
hostility to the West.5 In this void, NATO strove to encompass former enemies, provide 
leadership and guidance to nations in transition, and provide a forum for integration into 
new institutions of political and military cooperation.  Inclusion, cohesion and consensus 
became the new by-words for NATO’s strategic focus as the Alliance consolidated its 
victory over the Warsaw Pact.   
With this emphasis upon cooperation as opposed to conflict, NATO’s strategic 
concepts would replace “massive retaliation” (1957) and “flexible response” (1967) with 
an emphasis upon open consultation with former adversaries.  The institution provided a 
framework for consultation and coordination of policies among its member countries in 
order to diminish the risk of crisis, which could impinge on common security interests.6  
The alliance pursued its efforts to remove military imbalances; to bring about greater 
openness in military matters; and to build confidence through radical but balanced and 
verifiable arms control agreements, verification arrangements, and increased contacts at 
all levels.7  Reestablishing solidarity and rapport as well as decreasing the vestiges of the 
threat from a thermo-nuclear exchange would be encompassing strategic themes of 
NATO for the next twelve years and would result in an unprecedented degree of military 
transparency and cooperation in Europe. 
Conflict and instability were still factors within Europe, and areas outside of the 
member nation’s territory would concern the alliance during this period.  In the 1990-1 
Persian Gulf War, several European governments found that they lacked the military 
capabilities to respond beyond the Northern Atlantic treaty area to distant threats.8  While 
comprising a significant number of European nations within the Coalition, The Gulf War 
demonstrated embarrassing lack of expeditionary military capability within Europe and 
                                                 
5 NATO Strategic Concept 1991, Part 1, par. 1. 
6 NATO Handbook,  37. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Archick, Kristin and Gallis, Paul, CRS Report for Congress: NATO and the European Union, 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 4 January 2005,  1. 
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their continued reliance upon U.S. military and technological superiority.  A desire for 
Europeans to assume a greater collective military responsibility within the alliance   
would lend more focus to diplomatic consultations among the greater European military 
powers.  The shift towards greater European responsibilities and burdens would result in 
the first steps towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which would be 
included in the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991 adopted by the European 
Community (now the European Union).9   
1. NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept 
The importance of enhancing the roles and responsibilities of European member 
nations was recognized in the strategic concept; “The development of a European 
security identity and defense role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar 
within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also 
reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.”10  But, in the light of 
greater unity within Europe, came greater uncertainty and risks from outside the borders, 
as new and complex security issues threatened promised Euro-Atlantic peace and 
stability.  The alliance recognized that global influences could affect their security 
interests and a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of 
NATO members still remained.  Two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, President 
Bush and leaders of the other NATO governments in November 1991 agreed in Rome on 
a “strategic concept” intended to guide the alliance into the post-Cold War world.11 The 
new risks to allied security were identified as “…less likely to result from calculated 
aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of 
instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, 
including ethic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe.”12  This principle would define the new direction of NATO 
                                                 
9 “NATO in the post-Cold War World”, Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Paper Number 
46 Chapter 2, January 1996, pg. 2, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair46/m046ch02.html accessed 28 
April 28, 2005. 
10  NATO Strategic Concept, 1991, Part 2, par. 2. 
11 “NATO in the post-Cold War World”,  2. 
12 NATO Strategic Concept, 1991, Part 1, par. 9. 
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in succeeding years as less concern would be placed upon territorial defense and more 
focus placed upon these new, ambiguous and emerging threats. Collective security, based 
upon Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, while still valid, would no longer be the 
dominant approach to security. 
But the methods to be utilized by NATO’s Strategic Concept still relied upon 
methods more applicable to a confrontation of nation states desiring territorial expansion 
rather than the “spill over” effects from unstable environments on Europe’s periphery.  
The three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy were “dialogue, co-
operation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability.”13  The Strategic 
Concept states, “In these new (security) circumstances there are increased opportunities 
for the successful resolution of crisis at an early stage.”14, but relied upon cooperation 
and a permissive, willing environment to support intervention and involvement.  
Furthermore, the Strategic Concept predicted the requirement of a United Nations 
mandate in order to provide international legitimacy to multilateral military involvement 
and intervention.  “… The Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security 
interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth in the Charter 
of the United Nations”.  While effective in preventing reestablishment of Soviet/Russian 
militarism, providing a basis for reduced reliance upon nuclear weapons, and 
encouraging more European involvement in their security requirements, these elements 
fail to encourage the mechanisms necessary for effective crisis management and conflict 
prevention.  Unfortunately, crisis management and conflict prevention would be a 
prominent element of European foreign policy and a reluctant focus for NATO Security 
Strategy during this period. 
Unfortunately, no provisions had been established to deal with the failure of 
diplomatic and political methods outside the borders of NATO member nations.  The 
focus of NATO’s security strategy was still purely defensive, and not towards exporting 
security or conducting expeditionary operations.  NATO would soon be faced with crisis 
management due to the failure of conflict prevention in Bosnia, where increasing ethnic 
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tensions in the Balkans which resulted in the uncontrolled movements of large numbers 
of people.  These uncontrolled movements, particularly as a consequence of armed 
conflicts, concerned the security and stability affecting the alliance.15  When faced with 
the “spillover” of massive refuge movements on their borders, a non-permissive 
environment and the intransigence, and manipulation of the combatants, in particular the 
Serbians, would severely test the principles of NATO’s security strategy to conduct crisis 
intervention and out-of-area missions. 
2. Bosnia and Failure of Diplomatic Methods to Prevent Conflict (1991-
1995) 
During this time, the United Nations was struggling to assert itself as a strategic 
actor in the new security environment, embarking on a series of diplomatic and peace-
keeping missions in several failing nations, such as Somalia, and ethnically troubled 
regions in the former Yugoslavia.  The United Nations proved itself to be incapable of 
conducting humanitarian operations and peace missions in non-permissive or chaotic 
environments.  As the emerging conflicts intensified following the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, NATO was called upon to provide more direct and assertive leadership in 
establishing stability within Europe’s expanded borders and to stabilize the ethnic 
tensions and issues within the new region of responsibility. 
However, the United States was hesitant in providing the leadership necessary for 
effective NATO military operations, desiring a more prominent role for Europe in 
resolving the crisis.16  European diplomatic and political methods of engagement, defined 
by Joseph Nye as “Soft Power”, as well as a strategy of deterrence, détente and cohesion 
based upon a credible response (“Hard Power”) had proved to be an effective cooperative 
security arrangement during the Cold War era.  But the threat from the expanding conflict 
in the Balkans and the rising human rights violations taking place within Europe’s 
periphery demonstrated that these methods where ineffective and cumbersome in the 
evolving strategic environment and security challenges and risks. In the former 
Yugoslavian republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia, the alliance was 
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confronted with the failure of diplomacy.  Political and economic sanctions were 
ineffective and counter-productive in an environment of civil and human rights abuses 
and the blatant disregard of the government that conducted supported and/or tolerated 
programs of ethnic cleansing within their territory. 
The threat of widening ethnic tensions spreading from the Balkans, and the 
growing outrage of the international community eventually led NATO to conduct 
military operations to stabilize the region after the failure of UN-led peacekeeping 
missions.  These military campaigns constituted the first operational employment of 
NATO forces in combat.  While eventually successful, they brought to light significant 
weaknesses and other operational issues within the alliance’s framework. 
NATO’s first military challenge came after the United Nations finally 
acknowledged that UN sanctions and arms embargos were ineffective in preventing a 
growing number of Serbian atrocities in Bosnia.  From February 1994 to May 1995, 
NATO, at the request of the UN, conducted a series of ineffective “pinprick” raids 
against Serbian positions around Sarajevo.  In May 1995, Bosnian Serbs took hostage 
375 UN soldiers after NATO air strikes in Pale.17  After the Hostages were released, 
NATO prepared to react more vigorously to attacks by the Bosnians, finally resulting is 
massive air raids starting in August 1995 designed to cripple the Bosnian Serb army.18  
The Dayton accords negotiated an end to the fighting and the peace was finally enforced 
with the implementation of 60,000 troops of the NATO-led Implementation Force 
(IFOR) on 20 December 1995.  
Bosnia illustrated the fragility of peace and the socio-ethnic environment on 
Europe’s periphery as instable post-cold war governments struggled to consolidate a hold 
on power in the political vacuum resulting from the withdrawal of institutional 
dominance. While ultimately successful in stopping the fighting, NATO’s first 
expeditionary campaign was a diplomatic and humanitarian failure.  The appeal of 
ethnically inspired nationalism as a means to maintain power and achieve territorial 
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expansion had resulted in a human-rights catastrophe on NATO’s doorstep.   Diplomatic 
negotiations, sanctions, and arms embargos had failed to stop the violence. Economic 
sanctions take time to work and inevitably hurt those the most that they are designed to 
help.  The inevitable delays of negotiations only aided the Serbs in consolidating gains in 
Bosnia and in continuing a campaign of “ethnic cleansing”.  What terror did not finish for 
the Serbians, the coming of winter could assist.  Only when NATO belatedly conducted a 
credible military air campaign against the Serbian army did the Serbs agree to a 
negotiated settlement, and a sizable military force within the country would be the only 
guarantee of this settlement.  By then, estimates of an ultra-conservative low of 20,000 
people and an extreme high of 200,000 had been killed as a result of the nationalistically 
inspired ethnic violence.19  Bosnia has served as a precedent for the necessity of out-of-
area requirement and capability for NATO.   Article V, and collective defense, heretofore 
the foundation of NATO’s Security Strategy, would be regulated to the role of an 
ultimate insurance policy.  Non-Article V missions, and an emerging European Security 
and Defense identity, would demand the focus of NATO Security Strategy (1991- 1993). 
3. Developing a European Security and Defense Identity (1992- 1998) 
Europe had been progressing towards an independent defense identity despite the 
political demand for a post-Cold War “peace dividend” and the economic realities of 
reduced military budgets in the 1990’s.  The principle for an independent European 
defense policy was established by the Treaty of Maastricht which included in principle 
the “eventual framing of a common defense policy” which could “in time lead to a 
common defense.”20   NATO was still the essential military instrument in Europe but 
their focus remained the absorption, consolidation and inclusion of its former enemies of 
in Eastern Europe.  Furthermore, the American role in Europe and Europe’s place in 
American strategy was being redefined.  No longer was a massive transatlantic 
reinforcement of a besieged Europe the primary focus of American Defense Strategy.  
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Europeans began to conceive of a defense identity tailored towards their unique 
requirements in a new security environment. 
These requirements for European security and their defense role were identified in 
at the WEU ministerial at the Petersberg Hotel in Bonn, Germany. The “Petersberg 
Tasks” formalized the defense roles of the WEU in a focus towards “humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking”.21   The ‘Petersburg Tasks’ reflected the overall European 
orthodoxy at the time that, with the Cold War over and no immediate sign of a large 
standing military threat to the territory of western Europe, Europeans needed to reform 
their armed forces for frequent, but intensive, small and medium scale military 
operations.22    
Meanwhile, the weakness of European dependence on security from NATO in the 
new security environment had been demonstrated in Bosnia.  American involvement and 
leadership in European security was no longer assured or as natural as before, and 
Europeans did not have the means to question or really influence Washington’s strategic 
decisions.23  Also, the European preference for economic and diplomatic pressures was 
ineffective in preventing or resolving a war of territorial expansion on their borders, or 
the resulting humanitarian crisis’s.  When faced with the failure of diplomacy, Europe 
was forced to analyze their political and military weaknesses in order to create a defense 
identity in which NATO no longer held a monopoly upon European Security issues and 
would no longer be completely dependent upon participation by the United States.   
Without American involvement, NATO could not have intervened effectively in 
order to deal with the humanitarian crisis in the Balkans.  A defense institution based 
upon territorial defense would be inadequate in projecting the kind of mobile, 
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expeditionary and professional forces necessary to rapidly and effectively intervene in 
during crisis.  This was the real tragedy of Bosnia, as an effective military response in the 
very beginning of the conflict would have prevented the war and the human rights crisis.  
To be effective, an engagement must be backed by force.24  Since NATO did not have 
the political focus with regards to strategic purpose in Bosnia, or the means to effective 
project military power in the failure of diplomatic efforts, the Bosnian Serbs did not take 
the threat of a military response seriously.  Without the credible use of force, there could 
be no collective security for Europe in the absence of the United States.  Therefore, 
Europe would be required to acquire and develop a strategic culture and an organization 
that could anticipate events and take prompt, effective action to prevent, manage and 
resolve them. 
Europe continued progression to a common defense policy and the creation of a 
foreign and defense policy “pillar” with the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 
by the European Union.  Even though the risk of large-scale conflicts had fallen 
significantly compared to the Cold War period, Bosnia represented a resurgence of local 
conflicts that could pose a threat to European security.  In the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
Petersberg tasks of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, were incorporated into Title 
V (CFSP) of the Treaty on European Union.25  The Amsterdam Treaty also specifically 
states that the CFSP covers all questions relating to the security of the Union, including 
the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common 
defense, should the European Council so decide.26  Finally, the treaty transferred 
competences remaining from the WEU to the EU.  These measures demonstrate the 
member nation’s common desire to safeguard security through the execution (in concept) 
of multilateral out-of-area missions as a result of the Bosnian crisis. 
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The political and military weaknesses demonstrated by lack of political focus and 
military capability in the post Cold War security environment in light of the Bosnian 
experience had also inspired the United Kingdom and France to respond with a 
declaration in December 1998 in St. Malo, France.  They stated that the EU should 
develop “… the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, 
the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crisis”.27  These statements acknowledged the precedent that that the EU 
might decide on and execute defense actions outside the NATO framework and would 
continue the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) that was 
proposed in earlier treaties.  In June 1999, progresses from a European defense identity, 
continued towards a European defense policy, separate from NATO, at the European 
Council in Cologne.  The EU members declared that the European Union intended to 
play its full role on the international stage, “… we intend to give the European Union the 
necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common 
European defense policy on security and defense… the union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use 
them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without 
prejudice to actions by NATO.”28 
Eventually, repeated consultations would eventually establish a distinctly 
European security strategy, which would eventually become the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP), which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.  This strategy, 
adapted by the European Union, encompassed their efforts to establish a military pillar 
within the economic and political institution, and to become an effective strategic 
military actor in the international community.   
Europe was making considerable progress towards accepting, in principle, 
responsibility towards their security in the new security environment.  But European 
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security identity and policy had not yet translated into modern European military 
capabilities.  And despite the lessons from Bosnia and the progression towards a common 
European security Identity and policy, there was still resistance towards assuming new 
tasks beyond Europe’s borders due to strategic differences between Europe and the 
United States.  The regional threat was low, and European force planners were still 
comfortable with a largely Cold War defense strategy.  The European NATO member 
nations were spending an average of 60 per cent of the US total on defense, but they were 
not buying technologically advanced or expeditionary capabilities.29  By and large, 
Europe was maintaining a personnel-heavy military with aging equipment that would has 
difficulties operating in coalition with the Americans, or performing the requirements of 
an expeditionary/out-of-area security vision. 
C. IMPLEMENTING THE OUT-OF AREA FOCUS TOWARDS NATO 
SECURITY STRATEGY 
Having accomplished their first military intervention as a security actor and 
encouraged an assumption of greater security responsibilities in Europe by Europeans, 
NATO was effectively defined and promoting acceptance of a non-Article V role for the 
Alliance.  Furthermore, events in the Balkans, the NATO Strategic Concept, and the 
developing European Security and Defense Identity were advocating addressing out-of-
area crisis management and conflict prevention in a multilateral context.  NATO was 
further encouraging during his time continued consensus and ascension of several former 
Warsaw Pact nations into the Alliance, further demonstrating the successful utilization of 
diplomacy and cooperation as the preferred means to address European security concerns. 
 But the European preference upon these methods was fast becoming a 
dependency, as NATO’s expeditionary strategy and out-of-area focus were not being 
reinforced with the military capabilities or defense expenditures necessary to execute 
sustained expeditionary interventions.  Most European defense budgets were not only 
decreasing during this time, but were used to sustain military forces that contained large 
formations of non-deployable forces.  These forces did not have the advanced military 
technologies or the logistic and transportation support infrastructure required to meet the 
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crisis management and conflict prevention requirements of NATO security strategy or to 
execute those missions identified by ESDI and the “Petersberg Tasks”.  This lack of 
investment demonstrated the reluctance on Europe to depend upon a military alternative 
in the failure of diplomacy, preferring instead to rely upon American involvement should 
intervention be necessary.  Both this reluctance and the dependency were reflective of a 
Cold War doctrine of deterrence than the non-Article V focus necessary to prevent or 
manage conflict out-of-area.    
When conflict erupted once again in the Balkans, this time in Kosovo, Europe 
would be quicker to adapt military intervention as a necessity.  Unfortunately, the means 
to do so were primarily in the hands of the United States.  Kosovo would be defined as 
“campaign by consensus”, as member nation’s national caveats, and preserving the 
alliance would place severe restrictions on the military’s air campaign and operations that 
were conducted overwhelmingly by American resources.  Upon completion of the air 
campaign, Europeans would be forced to recognize the inadequacy of their military 
capabilities, while the United States would question the effectiveness of expeditionary 
and rapid-response operations conducted under the auspices and inherent restrictions of a 
multilateral security institution.  Thus NATO would suffer the consequences due to the 
lack of a credible multilateral military response in their new out-of-area focus.    
1. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept 
During NATO’s 1999 Washington summit, the Alliance reaffirmed the 
commitment to a broad approach to security.  In the development and adaptation of the 
NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, the purpose and tasks reiterated that the alliance 
“embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently 
tied to the security of Europe.”30  The European member nations were satisfied with the 
concept’s provisions of continued support for the transatlantic alliance, with promised US 
involvement in European security, while promoting the development of the ESDI through 
making NATO’s assets available for WEU-led operations.  Despite fears of an 
independent European military strategy would take away assets and focus from NATO 
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goals, the Strategic Concept repeatedly promised NATO assets and assistance towards a 
growing military pillar within the EU.   
While achieving consensus as to the gravity of the threat poised by terrorism and 
WMD, NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept states that political and diplomatic means should 
be the main instruments against both terrorism and proliferation.31   This demonstrated a 
lack of awareness of, and vulnerability to, these new and complex threats, and also a 
naïve desire to continue utilizing Cold War era methods to address these issues.    The 
option of NATO conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations was granted, but 
participation in such operations would be a decision for each member nation of the 
alliance.  Effective military capabilities would be necessary for the alliance to contribute 
to conflict resolution and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response 
operations.32    
But a discord would arise within the alliance with regards to the importance and 
definition of security threats facing the alliance.  New security threats were further 
defined in the Washington Summit as oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the 
collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
and the summit committed the alliance to a broad approach to security.33 The emphasis 
upon conflict prevention and crisis management within the Strategic Concept would 
foreshadow a more expeditionary role for the alliance and the growing focus upon out-of-
area missions.  Also, the first mention of strategic effects of non-state actors within 
NATO’s Strategic Concept would provide a subtle, but ominous warning towards the 
future of the alliance and the role it would play in the new security environment.34  Also, 
renewed conflict within the Balkans would prove that little had been accomplished 
towards increasing European military shortfalls, or discarding a Cold War security 
strategy  within  much of the alliance since the Bosnian intervention.  These methods had  
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been proven ineffective in responding to crisis management and ethnic violence in 
Bosnia, in preventing conflict in Kosovo, and would prove inappropriate in protecting 
from terrorism and WMD.    
2. Kosovo and the Lack of a Credible Military Response in Europe (1995 
– 1999) 
The conduct of combat operations in Kosovo underscored growing capabilities 
gap between the military forces of the United States and those of the European alliance 
members. Specifically, Europe had adequate ground forces but was incapable of 
deploying them, making any large-scale military foreign policy dependent upon NATO, 
and therefore the United States. This weakness of European military capability would be 
starkly displayed during the 78-day Kosovo air campaign and the different emphasis and 
priority that the member nations placed upon the credible use of force within foreign 
policy and a security strategy. 
When the familiar pattern of nationalist inspired ethnic violence repeated in 
Kosovo in 1999, the Alliance responded more rapidly than in Bosnia in 1995.  But the 
improvement in strategic focus, purpose and resolve among the Allies was not backed up 
with the military means and capabilities in Europe to enforce this policy.  Europe was 
once again dependent upon the superior technology and capabilities of the United States 
military once the Alliance began military operations against the Serbs.  The Europeans 
lacked the ability to communicate easily or securely with each other or with the 
Americans; of the communications capability in theater, 90 percent was American.35  
They had virtually no inventories of precision-guided munitions (except for British 
Tomahawks), and little capability (aside from some French) for all-weather or night 
fighter operations.36  As a result, 80 percent of the strike missions in theater (and two 
thirds of the total aircraft sorties) were flown by Americans.37  The Europeans depended 
upon American support aircraft for their sorties, especially for battle control, refueling 
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and for jamming and destroying Serbian radar.38  At the mundane but critical level of 
transportation and logistics, European force projection capabilities included only two 
roll-on, roll-off sealift ships, on lease, as compared to 12 for the United States, no fast 
sealift capability, (8 for the United States); and no large airlift capability (compared to 
254 aircraft for the United States).39  European military operational shortfalls and lack of 
modern, expeditionary capabilities had impeded the ability of the NATO’s European 
Allies to operate at optimal effectiveness with the United States.40 The allies placed 
different importance upon military capabilities, and this transatlantic inequality would 
have serious repercussions for future multilateral military operations and the role that 
NATO would play in them. This disparity of focus would lay the foundations for future 
discord with the Alliance and the creation of divergent security strategies between the 
major transatlantic security actors.  
While the burden sharing was unequal during the air campaign, the Allies were 
successful in achieving a unity of purpose within NATO.  The decision by the NATO 
members to use force for a purpose other than collective defense without an explicit UN 
Security Council authorization was not only exceptional, but set a precedent for further 
out-of-area interventions by the Allies.  An intervention in support of collective security 
without a major power or supranational institutional endorsement signified that the 
member nations of NATO were convinced of the justness and necessity of their actions, 
and were willing to assume the additional political and strategic risks in doing so.  The 
decision by the Allies to use force without explicit UN Security Council approval was 
consistent with their insistence since 1949 that the Alliance is not a regional arrangement 
or agency in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; defining the Alliance in these 
terms might be seen as subordinating it to the UN Security Council.41  In the end, by 
claiming that its intervention was necessary to halt human rights atrocities perpetrated 
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against the Kosovar Albanians by Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, NATO effectively 
declared that the rights of the Kosovar Albanians took precedence over those of a rights-
abusive, non-democratic state.42  The UN granted a left-handed affirmation through 
Secretary General Kofi Annan’s disapproval of NATO’s decision to act without Security 
Council authorization while agreeing that the intervention was necessary, and paid 
deference to the notion that state sovereignty is contingent upon respect for human rights.  
Though successful, the difficulties of utilizing a multilateral command structure within an 
alliance of unequal contributors while trying to achieve supranational legitimacy would 
prove to have later repercussions for NATO and the transatlantic relationship in 
executing future out-of-area operations. 
3. Operational Limitations and a Disparity of Focus and Purpose in 
NATO  
The strategic concerns of each member nation, at times, ran at cross purposes with 
not only the strategic concept of NATO, but with the strategy of the campaigns, 
especially in the Kosovo air war.  The format of “Campaigns by Consensus” proved 
exceedingly cumbersome for NATO’s operational commanders and for United States 
Combatant Commanders.  Initially, alliance members desired equal consideration, 
consultation, and inclusion in strategic objectives despite unequal contributions and 
capabilities.  Furthermore, the NATO institution did not lend itself to rapid decision-
making and adaptation to crisis management.  While more effective and mission oriented 
than the prior United Nations’ missions in the Balkans, NATO’s Operational 
Headquarters had difficulty in establishing unity of command and responding with unity 
of purpose in combat operations.   Member concerns over casualties and the violation of a 
sovereign nation’s territorial boundaries resulted in severe restrictions placed upon the 
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Such was the appeal to the press to publish that the Kosovo air-war was a “war by 
committee”; many argued that maintaining the coalition took priority over the efficient 
conduct of the war.43 
The emphasis upon consensus and cohesion also demonstrated the European 
preference for utilizing international organizations in order to legitimize interventions and 
violating a nation’s sovereignty.  Most of the Allies maintain that a UN resolution is still 
a requisite step, whenever possible, for military action by NATO.  The 1949 North 
Atlantic Treaty’s reliance on the consensus method of decision-making further bound the 
institution to developing a multilateral strategy in military operations.  During the 
Balkans conflicts, the United States’ administration became increasingly frustrated not 
only with the lack of European leadership, but with the cumbersome and lengthy decision 
making procedures of the alliance that frequently hamstrung operational planning in a 
campaign dependent upon American military capabilities and technology. Whereas the 
European allies carried out only 40 per cent of the air strikes, the latent crisis within the 
Alliance stemmed from the fact that while the Americans had great technological 
superiority in the air, political negotiations were necessary to obtain approval for most 
(807 out of 976) of the sorties carried out against targets in addition to those initially 
planned.44   
But with the resolution of combat operations in the Balkans, NATO demonstrated 
itself especially adept at prolonged support and stability operations and maintaining the 
peace in the former Yugoslav republics.  These long-term peacekeeping missions 
coincided with the European view of preventive engagement and a preference for a civic 
action or police role for their military forces.  Also, these missions highlighted European 
strengths in the greater development of “civilian power”- pre-and post-conflict 
management, peacekeeping, mediation, monitoring, and foreign assistance.45   This 
                                                 
43 Clark, Wesley, “Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat”, Oxford: Public 
Affairs Ltd., 2001,  454. 
44 Peters, John, “European Contributions to Operation Allied Force”, RAND Corporation, Santa 
Monica, CA, 2001,  25. 
45 Hamilton, Daniel, Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century, Center for 
Transatlantic Relations, Washington, D.C., 2004,  6. 
 24
preference for “soft power” led credence to the argument that Europeans should 
concentrate on providing support, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in the post-
combat  phase  of  military  interventions.   This role provided  a  potential  alternative to  
trying to match the US as a global super power, and developing an independent 
expeditionary capability, as well as an expeditionary security strategy, for their regional 
military forces.   
This role also worked well with the limited capabilities of the majority of NATO 
members who wished to participate but lacked the technology or the military wherewithal 
to do so effectively in a high-tech air campaign.  Yet an emphasis upon post conflict 
peacekeeping ignored the greater requirements of the alliance to be able to conduct 
prolonged military operations and combat deployments in order to address security 
threats “out of area”.  Through the Balkans campaigns, a minority of the members had 
provided the majority of the capabilities of which the primary contributor was the United 
States.  This dependency on the United States’ capability was in keeping with the cold 
war strategy of European dependence upon American military capabilities.  With the end 
of the cold war, this strategy’s relevance came into question as Europe depended upon 
the military means of the United States to establish the peace within their borders.  A 
strategy was developing that envisioned the Americans as “kicking in the door”, while 
the Europeans “cleaned up the mess”.  This could not continue if Europe was to remain a 
credible and influential actor in the international community.  If America was unwilling 
or unable to commit the preponderance of forces necessary to conduct NATO military 
operations, Europe would be vulnerable or irrelevant in times of prolonged US military 
operations elsewhere.  
D. NATO’S FALSE SECURITY: A VULNERABLE DEPENDENCY 
Shared democratic values have always been fundamental to NATO’s conception 
of itself, but constructing a liberal security order on a continent-wide scale requires that 
NATO not simply defend, but actually promote, its values outside NATO territory.46  
NATO’s new mission was no longer to defend an existing order but to construct a new 
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one, grounded on democratic values and encompassing areas outside NATO’s traditional 
sphere of defense.47  NATO evolved from a passive, reactive defense organization into 
one that actively builds security. In order to accomplish this, NATO needed to transform 
into an organization with the means, methods and capabilities to establish, promote and 
maintain these central values and practices.  
NATO was further promoting the development of European military capabilities 
through the continued support of ESDP.  The EU, realizing the requirement for an 
expeditionary focus and the capabilities to do so, proposed the military component of 
ESDP in the Helsinki (Dec 1999) and Nice (Feb 2001) European Councils. First, Helsinki 
established the 'headline goal', that is, the Union's capacity to deploy within 60 days, and 
sustain for at least one year, a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) up to 60 000 persons.48 The 
EU partners underscored the European commitment to ‘develop rapidly collective 
capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic 
transport’, and welcomed decisions some members had already made to coordinate early 
warning systems, open joint headquarters, reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of 
existing forces and prepare for a joint European air transport command.49  Second, new 
military structures were introduced at Nice, the most important being the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC). Replacing the Political Committee, the PSC keeps track of 
international developments; helps define policies and monitors implementation of agreed 
policies. Composed principally of national representatives, it is the lynchpin of crisis 
management activities.50 
NATO and European security and defense transformation was continuing in 
concept and design, but the investment in modernization of military capabilities was still 
not forthcoming.  By the beginning of 2001, no European Allied member nation, with the 
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exception of the United Kingdom, had proposed any real defense spending increase.  
While the United States continued to develop and implement sophisticated military 
technologies and integrated control systems (referred to as the Revolution in Military 
Affairs or RMA), reluctance to transform Cold War military models in Europe continued.  
In part, there was doctrinal resistance and a deep-seated opposition within European 
democracies to the use of force in foreign policy to stop even flagrant violations of the 
most basic values and human rights, as Europeans had demonstrated in both Bosnia and 
Kososvo.51  Economic realities were also considerations as France and Germany, both 
squeezed by non-defense needs and political focus upon the growing European Union 
expansion continued a decline in defense procurement and research spending.  
Furthermore, the lack of large, system-integrating defense contractors in Europe, 
combined with low defense R&D investment, and a lack of defense R&D coordination 
among the Europeans had furthered the transatlantic gap in the RMA.  By 1998, the 
combined R&D spending by the European NATO allies (90 percent of which was 
accounted for by Britain, France and Germany) was $9.7 billion dollars, as compared to 
$35.9 billion for the United States over the same period.52  Europe, falsely secure in the 
dependence upon superior US military capabilities in the event of unlikely hostilities, 
were still making choices that would regulate them as irreverent military actors and 
would question the validity of continued US support for the alliance. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The international community was immediately plunged into a new reality of the 
fragility of its security and the growing capabilities of heretofore-insignificant terrorist 
organizations with the climactic events of September 11, 2001, and the terrorist/WMD 
attacks within the United States.  The terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda upon the United 
States on September 11, 2001 would also highlight the fragile state of the NATO 
Alliance.  With a strong foundation on principle values and goals, NATO was vulnerable 
to different interpretations of the importance of security threats and the means and 
methods best to deal with them.  Furthermore, the technological and capability imbalance 
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promoted the development of unilateralist foreign policy options within the strongest and 
heretofore most crucial member of the Alliance.  Europe simply did not have the military 
capabilities necessary to execute either the requirements of NATO’s out-of-area strategy, 
or the provisions of the Petersberg Tasks in ESDI.  American military interventions in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and others in the US-led War on Terror would bring into question the 
strength of the Alliance, the role that it would play in international security, and the 
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III. NATO 2001 – 2002: AN UNDERUTILIZED POTENTIAL - 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY VS. UNILATERALISM AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11TH 
With the United States having developed a unique 21st-century military, 
NATO is an alliance that, having lost an (evil) empire, is in search of a 
role. 
Charles Krauthammer, 22 November 200253 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The immediate post-Cold War period presented NATO with a security threat that 
most of Europe was woefully unprepared for owing to a lack of political commitment, 
inadequate military capabilities and an unwillingness to invest in the defense spending 
required to adapt new technologies and doctrine necessary to influence security out-of-
area.  The magnitude of these challenges was first demonstrated by the wars and the 
subsequent NATO interventions in the former Yugoslavia.  These security challenges 
would take a new precedence in the Alliance and the transatlantic relationship after the 
cataclysmic events of September 11, 2001.   
Initially, the international community demonstrated overwhelming support and 
consensus condemning these attacks and supporting the military response by the United 
States against the organizations that committed these acts and the governments that 
harbor and provide for them.  NATO, and in effect, the European Union, had presented 
the United States the combined, consolidated diplomatic efforts of their security 
institutions, and offered the military capabilities of the collective member nations of 
Europe for whatever services were required.  In addition, the attacks had encouraged both 
institutions to reinvigorate their efforts to create a viable expeditionary capacity for the 
security of Europe, demonstrating a marked improvement and focus towards the 
modernization and “transformation” programs of their collective military capabilities. 
In the wake of the United States response to the terrorist attacks, the Bush 
administration would implement a new unilateralist security strategy and a period of 
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profound change with their foreign policy and in international relations with the Allied 
nations of Europe.  When presented with the means to conduct a multinational response 
to the terrorist attacks by the international community, the United States chose rather to 
respond alone, for all practical purposes leaving NATO to participate in the wake of the 
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in a supporting, stabilizing capacity.  While this alternative 
of the U.S. “opting out” was not unexpected, nor unprecedented, the resulting 
interventionist, unilateralist security strategy and the “Cowboy Diplomacy” of the “Bush 
Doctrine” would precipitate a transatlantic rift within NATO as the U.S. prepared to 
apply these methods to achieve a “regime change” under less definitive circumstances in 
Southwest Asia.  
B. NATO INTERVENES: AN “OUT-OF AREA” RESPONSE UNDER 
ARTICLE 5  
On September 11th, NATO stood at the threshold of another era of “tectonic 
shifts” in international politics, equal to the end of the Cold War and the rise of the Soviet 
challenge at the end of World War Two.54  The new destructive potential from trans-
national terrorist organizations, identified in the 1999 Washington Summit, manifested in 
the appalling terrorist attacks perpetrated against the United States in New York, 
Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C.  The paradigm of national security and defense 
strategy and doctrine was irrevocably altered.  “In the space of an hour, our world was 
transformed”, as NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated in reference to these 
events, “They brought home the futility of security concepts that focus on amassing tanks 
at one's borders.”55  The threat to NATO had come not against their borders, but through 
them. The post-Cold War potential for NATO to respond as a security actor would be 
tested, as all the long established alliances and venerable institutions would be tested, as a 
result of these events.56 
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1. September 11th and the Invocation of Article 5 
On September 12th, when the North Atlantic Council met in response to this 
unprecedented event in the history of the Alliance, the result was the invocation of 
Article 5.  For the first time, NATO had invoked the mutual defense clause of the 
Washington Treaty, which was the foundation of the Alliance’s defense strategy during 
the Cold War.  Ironically, Article 5 would be invoked in support of the Alliance’s most 
powerful and bedrock member: the United States.  A statement was issued by the North 
Atlantic Council following the terrorist attacks that promised, “the United States’ NATO 
Allies stand ready to provide the assistance that may be required as a consequence of 
these acts of barbarism.”57 
As a result of the invocation of Article 5, the member nations of NATO had thus 
pledged to respond “out-of-area” in order to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area.  By agreeing that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor could trigger 
NATO’s collective self-defense commitment, the Alliance had, in effect, mandated itself 
to make combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission.58    The attack against the 
United States was not a war of conquest and territorial acquisition, but an assault by an 
extremist, trans-national organization against the common values of democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law as espoused in the Washington Treaty of 1949.  President Bush 
further emphasized the ideological aspects of these attacks in a speech to the nation on 
the evening of September 11th when he stated, “America was targeted for attack because 
we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.”59   
The response to the immediate threat of terrorism called for increased collective 
measures, consensus and cooperation.  “Far more than Kosovo or Bosnia,” stated Lord 
Robertson, “the attacks of September 11th brought home the lessons of our 
interdependence.”60 The NATO Alliance, as well as the world, had not only united in 
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condemnation of the attacks, but had pledged the political, diplomatic, and in the case of 
NATO, existing military capabilities of Europe for use in response.  But the lessons and 
frustrations of multilateral operations utilizing established institutions such as NATO 
during conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the lack of significant European 
military capabilities to contribute to multinational efforts, would be evident not only in 
the response to the attacks, but in the developing National Security Strategy and the 
emerging unilateralist doctrine of the United States. 
2. Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security 
Assistance Force (2001 – 2003) 
The military operation to topple the Taliban regime, Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF), would not be a major multinational effort, but a U.S.-led war which included a 
very few select coalition partners.  The campaign would be waged utilizing the high tech 
military capabilities that were the predominant specialty and possession of the United 
States.  This capacity, plus the overwhelming support of the international community in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks, precipitated an operation dominated by the advanced 
weaponry and expeditionary doctrine of the United States military.  These superior 
capabilities, as well as the threat analysis, determinations, personal ethics and ideological 
beliefs of the Bush administration, were the military and political reasons that America 
decided not to ask for NATO assistance in the campaign.  Only the United States had the 
proper equipment to project military forces halfway around the world, and Washington 
did not want political interference from 18 Allies that could not make unique and/or 
significant contributions to the operation.61  On September 20th, 2001, President Bush 
had addressed a special joint session of Congress with the tenets of what was to become 
known as the “Bush Doctrine”, stating, “From this day forward, any nation that continues 
to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile 
regime.”62   
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The military forces of most of the European members of NATO still adhered to 
the Cold War model of large, non-deployable force structures that were intended for use 
within their contiguous borders.  This was the case despite the fact learned in the Balkans 
that to be effective, an engagement must be backed by force.63  The majority of the 
Alliance did not have the expeditionary capabilities or the interoperable communications 
or command structures to provide support to the U.S. campaign. Of the European Allies, 
only Britain had the capacity to provide support that could interoperate with U.S. 
capabilities, though Canada, Germany and France (in addition to Australia) promised 
military forces and support to the U.S. as the operation unfolded.64   
On October 7th, 2001, time had run out for the Taliban government to surrender 
the al-Qaeda terrorists to the United States and to close down the terrorist training camps 
in Afghanistan as demanded by President Bush.65  The unique characteristic of the 
military campaign to topple the Taliban would be the asymmetric application of U.S. 
power.  Operation Enduring Freedom consisted primarily of U.S. air strikes on Taliban 
and Al Qaeda forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of 
U.S. special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance 
and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces.66  These U.S. forces would provide the liaison, 
coordination and support necessary for the Afghan militia forces of the Northern Alliance 
to utilize the high-tech supporting arms and precision guided munitions that would 
rapidly topple the Taliban government.  Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines) 
moved into Afghanistan in December 2001 to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at 
the height of the fighting, but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban 
soldiers.67  Most of the fighting was between Taliban units and Afghan opposition 
militiamen.   
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While providing the diplomatic unity and consensus necessary for a multilateral 
operation, the lack of capabilities of NATO’s member nations had eliminated the 
Alliance from participating as an institution of crisis response and conflict prevention.  
Instead, NATO’s mission would be one of post-conflict support, stability operations, and 
humanitarian reconstruction in the wake of U.S. combat. The International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) would deploy under UN Mandate to Afghanistan in January 
2002.  Under the command of NATO members and involving 19 NATO Allies, ISAF’s 
mission was to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in creating a stable and secure 
environment in Kabul and its vicinity.68  Major U.S combat operations continued after 
the fall of the Taliban until May 1, 2003 when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and 
Afghan President Karzai declared major OEF combat operations ended.69   On 11 August 
2003, NATO took over command, coordination and planning responsibilities for the 
ISAF mission.  NATO, in effect, had been relegated to a supporting role in the United 
States’ Foreign Policy.  The impetus of the developing interventionism and the security 
ideology of the administration in the aftermath of the Afghanistan campaign would 
manifest in the publication of the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 
application of its tenets in the War on Terrorism.  
Unfortunately, this supporting role would not validate NATO’s existence to 
proponents of a U.S. unilateralist foreign policy.  “When the United States destroyed the 
Taliban using a handful of men and precision-guided munitions in a wholly new kind of 
war,” stated Charles Krauthammer, “ it demonstrated a military capability so qualitatively 
superior to that of the Allies that NATO instantly became obsolete.”70   Even proponents 
of U.S. decline, such as Paul Kennedy, wrote after the Afghan war: “The larger lesson… 
is that in military terms, there is only one player on the field that counts.”71  The success 
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of the U.S. campaign to topple the Taliban appeared to have serious repercussions for the 
role of NATO’s in out-of-area missions, as well as for the future of the Alliance itself. 
Though in reality, NATO was not completely idle after the September 11th attacks 
nor during in the developing War on Terror.  During this time, NATO had facilitated the 
requests of the United States for intelligence sharing and permissive over-flight rights for 
U.S. and Allied aircraft conducting missions in the campaign against terrorism.  In 
October 2001, the Alliance began Operation Active Endeavour, in which NATO’s 
Standing Naval Forces conducted naval patrols and monitored and escorted civilian 
shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar and the Eastern Mediterranean.72  Also, in 
October 2001, 13 NATO member nations provided additional Airborne Warning and 
Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft that were sent to help protect the United States.73 
Furthermore, the Alliance had extended its support to the United States after September 
11th, and once again at the start of OEF, fulfilling its requirements of the Washington 
Treaty to, “…assist the Party that has been attacked by taking such action as it deems 
necessary.”  And while the overthrow of the Taliban required only a small number of 
U.S. troops initially, sustained support and stability operations in Afghanistan have 
required a substantially higher amount of troops.  At present, more than 8,500 troops 
from 36 contributing nations involved in ISAF are under NATO command.74 This is in 
addition to the 18,000 U.S. troops that conduct post-war stabilization efforts as well as 
continued OEF combat operations in Afghanistan under separate command from 
NATO.75   
The scope, scale and nature of the extended post-conflict reconstruction mission 
in Afghanistan have suited the ethos of European military engagements, with its 
emphasis upon long–term engagement and post-conflict support.  Also, the Allies have 
been able to support the requirements of this type of mission even with the limited 
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technical capabilities of majority of their military forces.  Providing security and police 
patrols, operating Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Kabul and the immediate vicinity, 
as well as coordinating numerous civil-military and Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO) missions has provided and improved basic human needs and rebuilding of 
existing infrastructures such as hospitals, schools and utility services.76   NATO was 
demonstrating a strong record of successful conflict resolution and prevention in “out-of-
area” missions, even if the preference for the application of “Soft Power” did lack a 
certain “aggressiveness” that was an increasing characteristic of American National 
Security Policy in the aftermath of the Afghanistan conflict.  While NATO’s contribution 
to the fight against terrorism had already been significant, further efforts were undertaken 
to increase the military capabilities of Europe, as well as improving the crisis response 
and expeditionary potential of the Alliance. 
C. EUROPE’S COMMITMENT TO EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY 
The vulnerability of the United States had demonstrated to Europe the fragility of 
their security.  As the lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo had confirmed, diplomatic measures 
could be insufficient by themselves, without the enforcement mechanism of punitive 
military action when faced with non-compliant organizations and institutions.  The 
September 11th attacks further emphasized the necessity for increased efforts towards 
modernizing Europe’s military capabilities.  In order to maintain any influence as a 
security actor, a collective Europe would have to have the means to enforce policy by the 
use of force, when necessary, and ideally, as a last resort when all other measures had 
been exhausted.  
1. The NATO Prague Summit, the Prague Capabilities Commitment 
and NATO Transformation (2002 - 2003) 
Billed as the “NATO Transformation Summit”, the November 2002 Summit in 
Prague ended with the adoption of far-reaching decisions on the Alliance’s future roles 
and tasks.77  The package of measures adopted by the Alliance were aimed at ensuring 
that NATO would have the tools needed to meet the new threats and unique challenges of 
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the post-Cold War security environment, especially those prominent in the War on 
Terrorism.  These provisions established the means and requirements of NATO to better 
carry out the full range of its missions and to respond collectively to those challenges, 
including the threat posed by terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WND) and their means of delivery.78 In order to carry out these missions, 
NATO determined it must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they 
are needed, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment 
where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve 
their objectives.79  The means that NATO would use to accomplish these missions were 
established in the Prague Summit, and were encompassed in 4 major transformation 
initiatives. 
The first of these initiatives was the establishment of the NATO Response Force 
(NRF).  The NRF is a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and 
sustainable force that includes land, sea and air elements ready to move quickly wherever 
needed, and form the essential element of NATO’s transformation agenda.  The NRF is 
designed to carry out certain missions on its own or serve as part of a larger force to 
contribute to the full range of Alliance military operations, sustain itself for one month, or 
longer if resupplied.80  The missions and tasks that the NRF are likely to concentrate on 
are those requiring the ability to react with the most capable forces in a very short time.  
These missions could involve deployment as a stand-alone force for collective defense 
missions under Article 5, such as show of force and solidarity to deter aggression, or as 
non-Article 5 “out-of-area” missions involving crisis management or stabilization 
operations.  At full operational capability the NRF would contain 21,000 troops and 
initially proposed to be fully operational by October 2006.81 These personnel would be 
assigned from the standing formations and existing units of the military forces of 
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NATO’s member nations, and would not constitute a permanent NATO “army”.  The 
NRF would also be the key catalyst for focusing on and promoting improvements of 
Alliance military capabilities, in very close relationship with the second transformation 
initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). 
The “Prague Capabilities Commitment” scaled down to 8 the some 58 areas for 
upgrading and procurement of the 1999 Washington Summit Defense Capability 
Initiative (DCI).82 This program reduction was in recognition of the limited resources of 
most of the member nations’ defense budgets, and would set more obtainable goals for 
the Alliance members to shorten the capabilities gaps, as well as in the immediacy of the 
threat of terrorism and the environments that promote it, towards NATO.  Also of note 
was the firm and specific commitment of individual Allies to improve their individual 
capabilities that would promote and support not only collective defensive measures, but 
sustained expeditionary missions as well.  While identifying capability gaps within the 
Alliance, the PCC proposed that these shortfalls could be addressed through multinational 
efforts, role specialization and reprioritization, if the subsequent financial and 
parliamentary approval could be obtained.83 The multinational reinforcement, 
development and support aspects of the PCC would speed up NATO’s ability to obtain 
the means to effectively execute non-Article 5 and crisis response missions.  
The Third transformation initiative was the streamlining of NATO military 
command arrangements. Recognizing the difficulties and frustrations of Alliance 
operations in the Balkans campaigns, NATO’s military command structure was to be 
streamlined into a leaner, more efficient and deployable command structure based upon 
agreed minimum military requirements among the Allies.  This restructuring would 
facilitate meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions, but 
in particular, for non-Article 5, “out-of-area” and crisis response missions, which require 
a rapid response and an expeditionary capability.  
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The new command structure would contain two strategic commands more focused 
towards expeditionary crisis response operations, one operational, and one functional.  
The functional command would facilitate transformation of military capabilities and the 
promotion of interoperability of Alliance forces.  Two Joint Force Commands would 
support the strategic command for operations, able to generate a land-based Combined 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters and a more limited standing joint headquarters 
from which a sea-based CJTF headquarters can be drawn.84  There would also be land, 
sea and air components within the CJTFs, giving these units the full spectrum of military 
capabilities.     
The final initiative involved developing defenses against the new threats of 
terrorism, WMD and cyber attacks.  Included in these initiatives were specific 
endorsements of Alliance defense capabilities against nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons, as well as a feasibility study of a missile defense system.  This initiative is more 
focused and applicable towards Article 5 collective self-defense, though methods 
developed could be utilized in security and force protection measure for deployed units 
“out-of-area”.  
With prompting from both the United States and the European Union, NATO was 
adopting a serious effort to obtain the concepts and capabilities necessary to execute 
“out-of-area” missions. While an impressive amount of promise could be visualized by 
adopting innovative measures and commitments towards increasing military capabilities, 
NATO, as an institution, had to be utilized by its members in an expeditionary capacity 
during crisis response in order to achieve its full potential as a security institution.  By not 
having the capability or the expertise to implement the Article 5 defense guarantee, the 
Alliance had been threatened with irrelevance when the U.S. “opted out” of the mutual 
defense assurance promise and was pursuing a unilateralist security strategy.  If the 
United States did not see the merits of utilizing the institution for security and crisis 
response, The more powerful European members of NATO would be tempted to pursue 
their  individual  security  interests   rather  that  the  collective  defense  of  the  Alliance.   
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NATO would be underutilized and relegated to the margins by policy makers in the same 
manner as the 55-member nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE).85   
2. European Security and Defense Policy: Developing an “Out-of Area” 
Capability within the Europe Union (2001 – 2003) 
Europe continued in their efforts to assume more of their share of the security 
burden required within the continent. The EU had previously set up political and military 
decision-making structures for European expeditionary operations in pursuit of the 
“Petersberg Tasks”; humanitarian and rescue work, peacekeeping and peacemaking, as 
well as the fielding of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 60,000 troops by 2003. While 
viewed optimistically by some as a possible alternative or replacement for NATO, 
realists within the EU had a more pragmatic view of this aspect of the CFSP.  “Neither 
development would be desirable in my view,” stated EU External Relations 
Commissioner Christopher Patten on March 2001, “More to the point, neither is remotely 
realistic in the foreseeable future.”86 Far from wanting to encourage a gradual American 
disengagement from Europe, the EU was striving to maintain U.S. involvement in 
European security, and the most efficient means to do so was through NATO.  The risk to 
NATO, to the transatlantic link and to the Euro-American relationship, would not stem 
from what Europe is building, but from what Europe is not doing.87  
The EU continued progress towards assuming greater security responsibilities by 
planning its first out-of-area military missions, proposing to assume control of the post-
conflict support and stability operations in the Balkans from NATO.  The Copenhagen 
European Council of 2002 had defined a developing independent EU military identity, 
and in the provisions of the council, the European Union stated its willingness to take 
over military operations in Bosnia from NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) as well as 
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NATO operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).88  A 
fundamental principle agreed between NATO and EU officials was that any EU mission 
would be administered under the “Berlin Plus” agreement.  The “Berlin Plus” agreement 
is a short title for a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and the EU, 
based upon conclusions of the Washington Summit, that was formalized in a “Framework 
Agreement” on 17 March 03.89  The Berlin Plus agreement formalized the framework on 
the institutional and operational links between NATO and the EU that would grant the 
EU access to NATO planning and assets for operations in which NATO is not engaged.  
Once the Berlin Plus agreements were finalized in March 2003, the EU took over from 
NATO in the FYROM.   The EU operation in the FYROM, Operation Concordia, was the 
first test case of the Berlin Plus Agreements, a small and limited mission of 350 troops 
that provided liaison and monitoring operations as well as providing advice on security 
and defense to Macedonian officials.90   
EU officials had viewed the initiative to lead a follow-on peacekeeping force in 
Bosnia as an outgrowth of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as 
well as an extension of the EU’s preference for long-term engagement and conflict 
prevention as an applicable strategy in the Western Balkans.  By assuming these duties in 
Bosnia, the EU could further develop ESDP on an operational level as well as 
complement a broader EU integration strategy for Bosnia as it aspired to eventual EU 
membership.  But NATO would not act immediately upon the EU offer.  There were 
initial beliefs that such a handover was premature due to the EU not being able to field 
the complete force of 12,000 troops required to take over completely from NATO, as 
well as the desire for NATO to continue pursuing the apprehension of indicted war 
criminals and conducting counter terrorism operations in Bosnia.  The inability of the EU 
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to field the full complement force of 12,000 troops had demonstrated that Europe was 
still a long way from fulfilling the requirements of the Helsinki Headline Goals, fielding 
the EU’s RRF, and from conducting large scale, sustained expeditionary operations.  Due 
to these considerations, NATO would not achieve a consensus on the concept of a EU 
follow-on military mission in Bosnia until December 2003.  Shortfalls aside, Operation 
Althea would eventually place stabilization responsibilities for Bosnia under a EU 
military force and would be described as a successful implementation of the Berlin Plus 
agreements between NATO and the EU.91   
In the wake of September 11th, The EU was promoting multilateral cooperation 
with the U.S. and NATO, the shifting of the security responsibilities from dependence 
upon U.S. participation, and sharing the burden of dealing with situations of crisis, 
instability and conflict prevention on Europe’s periphery by procuring the military 
capabilities to do so.  Meanwhile the U.S. administration was developing a national 
security strategy that would contrast these efforts and evoke tenets and methods that 
would present the future of trans-Atlantic relations in general, and the Alliance in 
specific, and with a greater internal political and security crisis than presented either by 
the terrorist attacks of September 11th, or the unilateralist response of the United States to 
the Taliban government in the Afghanistan conflict.  As the United States National 
Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 placed increasing emphasis on direct military action 
over political and diplomatic measures to counter threats in the aftermath of 9/11, the 
differing ideologies and methods between the United States and the European members 
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D. “COWBOY DIPLOMACY”: THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROAD TO IRAQ 
American de facto dominance of NATO was manifest by the amount that the 
United States spends on its armed forces annually (about $290 billion in 20020 is more 
than twice that of the combined military outlays of the European allies ($116 billion). 92  
After September 11th, American preeminence in military spending and capabilities 
encouraged Washington to exploit its might by pursuing an increasingly unilateralist 
foreign policy in which substantive debate would be viewed with suspicion and labeled 
as disloyal. “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make,” proclaimed 
President Bush to the U.S. Congress on September 20, 2001, “Either you are with us, or 
you are with the terrorists.”93  Now that America was conducting a war, it would seek to 
take advantage of its military supremacy, and wage that war on its own terms.  The 
United States would follow its own agenda, defining friends and foes by the sole criterion 
of their stance in the war on terrorism, and a sovereign right to attack and change any 
regime that harbored terrorists while naming countries in a supposed ‘axis of evil’ that 
was only remotely, if at all, linked to al-Qaeda.94  These views would culminate in the 
publishing of the National Security Strategy of the United States in September 2002 
(NSS), and the execution of this doctrine would provoke divisions and divisive reactions 
within the Alliance between Europe and the United States.  Critics of the United States’ 
interventionist doctrine accused the Bush administration of practicing “Cowboy 
Diplomacy.95  
1. The Ideology of the National Security Strategy 
The primary justification for the ideologically based doctrine contained of the 
NSS is that the United States is in a state of war.  “The war against terrorists of global 
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reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration.”96  This focus provides the impetus, 
and the rational for the assertive, provocative, and intimidating language of the NSS, 
which is meant as a clear signal, not only as the strategy of the administration, but as a 
message of intent to all those in the international community; allies, competitors, and 
aggressors.  The U.S. would now view the world through the prism of the war on terror, 
and would apply a Manichean view of “Being with us or against us” with regards to 
obligations to support international institutions.97 The National Security Strategy of the 
United States had become ideology; a strategy based upon beliefs, convictions, as well as 
distinctly U.S. interpretations of the security environment.   
The strategic objectives as set forth in the United States’ NSS involve promoting 
the American ideology of defending, preserving and extending peace and freedom.  
These objectives will give rise to an international environment based upon democracy 
and free enterprise, according to the NSS, which will then be the central building blocks 
for sustained national success and peaceful interstate relations.98 What give these ideas 
their particularly American locus are the methods prescribed to implement them. “We 
can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past…” states the NSS, 
“...to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary, act preemptively”99 
While espousing values integral to democracies, such as political and economic 
freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and the respect for human dignity, the NSS 
makes distinctly American interpretations with regards to the threat from terrorism, the 
state of the international security environment, and the methods used to defend against 
and defeat them. The U.S. of dealing with the threat is to directly engage the terrorists 
and the organizations that support.  Furthermore, the U.S. will make no distinction 
between these organizations and the nations, regimes or governments that support them. 
This focus would place the resources of the U.S. against the individual operators and 
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terrorist organizations that commit the crimes, rather than the socio-economic 
environment and conditions that promote terrorism.      
An additional prerogative issued in the NSS is the justification of U.S. 
unilateralism in response to security threats, both real and perceived. A strategic 
distinction within the NSS is that while stating the benefits, as well as the necessity, for 
international diplomatic and security institutions such as the NATO, the European Union 
and the United Nations, the U.S. would not require either their support or legitimacy in 
order to ensure the defense of America.  “While the United States will constantly strive to 
enlist the support of the international community,” states the NSS, “We will not hesitate 
to act alone, if necessary to exercise our right of self defense by acting 
preemptively…”100 This proclamation would be more than justification, it would declare 
an interventionist mandate that would validate rapid and confrontational foreign policy 
decisions, even when based upon incomplete and/or faulty intelligence and analysis. 
2. Europe Strong-armed:  Between Submission and Resistance  
The NSS concedes that America needs support from allies and friends with regard 
to intelligence, law enforcement, and the disruption of terrorist financing, as well as the 
building of coalitions both under NATO’s mandate as well as those based upon a specific 
mission.  While acknowledging the benefits of multinational cooperation, the NSS also 
highlights the shortfalls in capabilities that of these institutions suffer in providing the 
necessary security against terrorism and in the post Cold-War world.  “NATO must build 
a capacity to field, at short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they 
are needed,” states the NSS, “to respond to a threat against any member of the 
Alliance.”101 Therefore, the NSS uses the capabilities gap as further justification for a 
unilateralist foreign policy and security strategy in the short term, while publicly calling 
for further investment by the European nations not only in their own security, but also in 
expeditionary capabilities, in the long term.  This proclamation to Europe also implies 
that by creating the modern, expeditionary capability, it will further maintain U.S. 
participation and support towards European security.  “If NATO succeeds in enacting 
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these changes, the rewards will be a partnership as central to the security and interests of 
its member states as was the case during the Cold War.”102  
This implicit threat was reinforced with the preference being demonstrated by the 
U.S. to create mission-based coalitions to respond to specific security threats and in crisis 
response situations.103 NATO now ran the risk of being trivialized without continued 
U.S. support, and having their authority severely damaged by withholding the military 
capabilities that the Alliance was dependent upon to provide enforcement of the 
organizations diplomatic measures.  Without America, NATO would be powerless as a 
security actor for a significant period of time, and perhaps could never regain the 
legitimacy and acknowledgement necessary for the institution to continue in that 
capacity.   
E. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. would continue to utilize the public proclamations of intent, as well as 
the “carrot and stick” approach to diplomacy with friends, as well as with enemies, prior 
to, and after the publication of the National Security Strategy in September 2002.  While 
sympathetic to the devastation wrought by the September 11th attacks, supportive of the 
U.S. military response with the invasion of Afghanistan, and committing to measures that 
would led towards assuming more of the security responsibilities and burdens of Europe, 
America’s principle European Allies were losing patience with the particular brand of 
“Cowboy Diplomacy” being practiced by the Bush administration, which placed a higher 
emphasis upon compliancy and obedience than of partnership and cooperation.104  “The 
Bush Administration places a higher value on acting on its own authority, and in 
particular, on the use of American military force.” 105 This conviction, backed up by their 
superior military capabilities, resulted in the U.S. preference for ad hoc coalitions that 
were to be the means of implementing a dominant American interpretation of the security 
environment and foreign policy views.    
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Many European countries would not be able to follow these U.S. perceptions 
when the focus of the War on Terror would shift from Afghanistan to Iraq.  While 
beholden to America for their immediate expeditionary capabilities, Europe would not 
compromise with regards to their values, convictions and ideals in providing diplomatic 
and political support to the growing campaign mounting against the regime of Saddam 
Hussein, promoted by dubious evidence with regards to the presence of proscribed 
“WMD”.  Faced with the polarizing extremes of blind submission or overt opposition to 
the “hyper-superpower”, NATO’s Allied nations would be unable to achieve the 
consensus necessary to support a “Regime Change” in Iraq, even in the face of significant 
human rights violations by the regime, as well as continued non-compliance with UN 
Security Council resolutions in place since 1991.  This stance would promote the most 
serious rift in the transatlantic Alliance, while providing further impetus towards the 
creation of an expeditionary “out-of-area” military capability within Europe, and a 
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IV. NATO 2002 – 2003:  THE TRANSATLANTIC RIFT -  THE 
IRAQ WAR AND THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WITHIN “OLD 
EUROPE” 
Long established alliances and venerable institutions are being tested. 
Dr. Condoleeza Rice, National Security Advisor, 26 March 2003 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the implementation of the ideology defined in the National Security 
Strategy, and as the stabilization mission in Afghanistan became a more multinational 
and multilateral effort, the United States shifted the focus of their security strategy and 
foreign policy towards a more ill-defined objective: achieving a regime change in Iraq.  
When efforts failed to utilize first the UN, and then later NATO, in order to achieve 
legitimacy and coalition support for this distinctly American objective, the United States 
would once again choose to act unilaterally, ignoring international norms for intervention 
and demonstrating a callus disregard for established multilateral institutions.  In forming 
a “coalition of the willing” a line in the sand would be drawn by which the United States 
would define their supporters in the War on Terror, as well as a distinction between “old” 
and “new” Europe. 
When the United States achieved their objective six weeks later, the speed and 
efficiency with which “regime take-down” was executed initially signaled another 
success for the unparalleled U.S. ability to project their military capabilities, as well as ex 
post facto validation of American hegemony and the Bush Administration’s unilateralist 
foreign policy.   But the cohesive, sympathetic and generous support of the international 
community, as well as the mandate of NATO’s Article 5, that were the distinct features 
of the Afghanistan conflict, would be noticeably absent from the war in Iraq.  NATO’s 
future as an expeditionary crisis response mechanism would suffer collateral damage 
from U.S. foreign policy in Iraq as well, as a trend was developing regulating the 
 50
institution’s role towards only post-conflict stabilization responsibilities, being critically 
referred to as “just one tool in the American tool box to face crises.”106   
Initially comprised of a coalition of fifty nations,107 the participating nations 
would bear increasing domestic criticism and skepticism in the international community 
for being pawns in a mission that was for all practical purposes a U.S. operation with a 
weak, ill-defined mandate.108  This criticism, along with a growing level of insurgency, 
violence, terrorism and intimidation against coalition occupation forces and the Iraqi 
people, would lead some of the contributing nations to withdraw their forces from the 
coalition and for other participants to question their further support of the mission.109 The 
weakening coalition, and the growing insurgency would also damage U.S. international 
prestige and legitimacy and would place a considerable and prolonged draw upon the 
instrumental U.S. expeditionary capability that was the lynchpin in the execution of the 
“Wolfowitz Doctrine”. 
Because the U.S. disregarded international, transatlantic and European security 
institutions, significant powers of Europe did not support the intervention, and also would 
hesitate or withhold support to U.S. stabilization and security operations in Iraq.  A 
Franco-German resistance would attempt to coalesce political and diplomatic opposition 
against ideological intimidation by the Bush administration, as well as U.S. efforts to 
trivialize the EU’s role as a security actor. Unfortunately, the result of this resistance 
movement would be a polarized continent, as the European nations aligned either in 
support of, or in opposition to, U.S. foreign policy.  Not only would the opposition to 
U.S. foreign policy be divisive for Europe, but also it would prevent them from achieving 
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the institutional consensus necessary to adopt the measures needed to continue the 
development of ESDP with the EU, and to progress towards a security role 
commensurate with the institutions commercial and diplomatic influence in the 
international community. 
Out of the discord, renewed efforts towards European, transcontinental and 
supranational communication and cooperation would result.  The United States would 
request a larger role in post-conflict Iraq from the United Nations, a role that the 
institution would continue despite a tragic bombing of the U.N. mission’s headquarters in 
Baghdad.  NATO would become involved in post-conflict stabilization efforts in Iraq as 
well.  In response to a request from the new interim Iraqi government, NATO would once 
again execute an out-of-area mission, after a rapport (of sorts) was achieved within the 
Alliance.110   
The EU would also continue to refine their efforts to promote the transformation 
of their military force and accompanying doctrine in order to achieve a modern 
expeditionary potential for the institution, and to define their security strategy.   The 
results of these efforts would be a distinctly European Security Strategy being adopted by 
the EU, and the execution of the institution’s first truly “out-of-area” expeditionary 
military mission completely independent from NATO and U.S. oversight.111  
Furthermore, these distinctions would highlight an increasing capacity for autonomous 
military action by the European Union.  
B. IDEOLOGY BECOMES FOREIGN POLICY:  IMPLEMENTING THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY  
In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. had rebounded with a new focus and vigor 
towards an interventionist security strategy and foreign policy based upon the exceptional 
expeditionary military capabilities of their armed forces.  The United States had been 
granted overwhelming consensus and support by the international community towards 
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retaliatory military operations against terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and the 
Taliban regime that supported them.  During the conduct of this campaign, the United 
States had applied a unique, asymmetrical strategy utilizing both high-tech and 
specialized military capabilities that had rapidly achieved both operational and strategic 
objectives with minimal involvement of, and risk to, ground forces. Upon completion of 
“major” combat operations, the U.S. had cooperated with the Alliance in order to 
coordinate the major involvement of a sustained multinational post-conflict stabilization 
mission through the auspices of NATO.  When command of the post-conflict mission 
passed to NATO, the hand-over of the continuing multilateral stability mission would 
represent a here-to-fore unprecedented level of transatlantic operational consensus and 
cooperation, as well as facilitating the execution of U.S.-led “continuing” security 
operations missions.     
This exceptional level of multinational cooperation was not to last.  The 
publication of the National Security Strategy of the United States in 2002, in which the 
White House explicitly emphasized its right of pre-emptive action, was received with 
great reservations in many countries and raised concerns in numerous European capitals 
and among European Public opinion.112  Furthermore, the Bush administration began 
asserting direct links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, instilling a popular belief that somehow 
Saddam Hussein had been involved in the attacks on September 11, 2001.  While both 
had America as an enemy, any overt collaboration between the regime and the terrorist 
organization could not be proven.  That, and the fact that al-Qaeda and the Regime of 
Saddam Hussein espoused different ideologies (The establishment of a religious Islamic 
caliphate by al Qaeda vs. a secular, socialist, pan-Arab society espoused by Hussein’s 
Baathism) were conveniently ignored as the administration began forming a coalition to 
conduct the next campaign in America’s War on Terror: effecting a “regime change” in 
Iraq.113 
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1. The “Wolfowitz Doctrine” 
Saddam Hussein’s evasion and blocking of the UN inspection teams verifying 
compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 687 that declared the cease-fire in and 
required removing Iraqi inventories of WMD from the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War would 
provide the rationale for the regime change.  A growing neo-conservative ideology of 
“pushing change” in the region, advocated in the so-called “Wolfowitz Doctrine” of 
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz was demonstrating a profound influence 
within the Bush administration.114  Under the previous U.S. administration of President 
Clinton, in a letter addressed to the president, and including signatures by both Rumsfeld 
and Wolfowitz, the authors had stated that the only acceptable strategy with regards to 
Iraq, “Is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use 
weapons of mass destruction…In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and 
his regime from power…That now needs to become the aim of American foreign 
policy.”115   
Removing Saddam Hussein from power would allow for the implementation of 
the “Wolfowitz Doctrine” that advocated a creation of a free, stable and democratic Iraq 
that would serve as a model to the neighboring Arabic countries.  This model would then 
ideally inspire a subsequent spread of democratic changes and movements across the 
region.    Specifically, Wolfowitz would emphasize that the power of the democratic idea, 
once established (installed) in the region, would have a profound effect in a part of the 
world known for its authoritarian regimes.116  This advocacy and its subsequent 
execution would set the stage for a clash of cultures and a political confrontation within 
NATO that would center this time not over a capabilities gap, but over strategic policy 
goals and the methods used to achieve them.  In disagreement over the methods as to how 
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best achieve and promote international security, as the Allies would align, and thus be 
defined, in terms of their support or opposition of U.S. foreign policy goals.  
2. A Clash of Cultures  
The Neo-conservatives of the Bush administration was not embraced within 
Europe, as neither was the active installation of democracies through intervention or the 
preemptive doctrine of the NSS.  Having endured a century’s worth of ideological 
authoritarianism, totalitarianism and/or imperialism implemented from militarism, 
fascism and communism over the last century, having suffered the consequences or 
effects of prolonged wars and conflicts, and having removed the dominating specter of 
the Soviet Union from the borders or as occupiers, Europe as a whole believed that they 
had finally achieved a strong measure of peace, security and multinational cooperation. 
“For Europeans, the removal of the Soviet threat brought a new sense of security”, stated 
Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, “As 
our borders became secure we cashed in our peace dividend… By contrast, 9/11 has 
shattered your century-old feeling of security through geography.”117   
Though sharing common democratic values, and a belief in the security that 
democracy establishes through the world, the United States and Europe were at odds as 
how to best achieve this goal.  The advocacy of installing democracy through outside 
force was not in accordance with the European preference of promoting the conditions 
and establishing the environments from which democratic institutions might emerge.  In 
light of the events of the last century, and especially present in their dealing with the 
Balkans intervention, Europe was decidedly hesitant to resort to military force to achieve 
foreign policy goals, preferring the application of “soft power” and long-term 
“preventive” engagement.  The application of “hard power”, military force and an 
interventionist “preemptive” engagement policy, such as advocated by the NSS, 
represented to Europeans the failure of diplomacy and foreign policy, not its continuance 
by other means, and was decidedly not the implied or preferred method such as the 
Clauswitzian tenets of the NSS proclaimed.  Further, while the U.S. had the means to 
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project their power and influence, Europe did not, as the necessary measures to fully 
implement the ESDP in the EU, and to adopt an expeditionary military capability, were 
still in their infancy.  Therefore, in order to project an influence, Europe still had to 
utilize those means available, or rely upon the cooperation and capabilities of the United 
States through NATO.  
3. Impasse in the United Nations: The European Resistance Movement 
Builds (2002 – 2003) 
A further preference for military intervention by Europe was to do so under a UN 
mandate, especially with regards to out-of-area missions.  The conduct of expeditionary 
operations that proposed violation of sovereign territory was a sensitive issue in Europe 
due to the reference of its exploitive colonial past.  While the regime of Saddam Hussein 
was clearly not cooperating with the inspection provisions of UNSC Resolution 687, 
there was no clear and irrefutable proof that Iraq possessed or that it was manufacturing 
WMD.  Therefore, at the behest of the European allies, President Bush secured UN 
Security Council Resolution 1441 in November 2002, which would hold Iraq in “material 
breach” of its obligations under previous resolutions, affording Iraq a “final opportunity 
to comply” with its disarmament obligations, while setting up an enhanced inspection 
regime for full and verified completion of the disarmament process established by 
resolution 687 (1991).118 
When the UN Security Council passed resolution 1441, the transatlantic rift began 
in earnest as the United States and an opposing coalition headed by France and Germany 
interpreted the resolution to their own self interests.  The Bush administration took quite 
literally the word “final”; for though acknowledging that there were no automatic triggers 
for a military response in the resolution, the resolution did not prevent a nation, or 
coalition of nations from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by that country, 
or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security.119  
“Americans would continue to seek security in a threatening world’” stated Carl Bildt, 
                                                 
118“Security Council Holds Iraq in ‘Material Breach’ of Disarmament Obligations, Offers Final 
Chance to Comply, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1441 (2000),” United Nations, Press Release SC 
7564, 8 November 2002, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm accessed 5 May 2005. 
119 Statement by John Negroponte, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, United Nations, Press 
Release SC 7564, 8 November 2002. 
 56
“through asserting what they consider their sovereign right of self-defense.”120  American 
predetermined foreign policy goals would be further frustrated when Iraq agreed to once 
again permit the UN inspection teams to proceed.  
C. REGIME CHANGE AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE:  INEFFECTIVE 
SECURITY INSTITUTIONS, A DIVIDED EUROPE, AND THE 
TRANSATLANTIC RIFT  
France and Germany, supported by China and other members of the UN Security 
Council, were taking the view that inspections be allowed to continue in order to 
establish whether Saddam Hussein had disarmed or not.  French President Jaques Chirac 
and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder stated that they were not convinced that a war 
with Iraq was necessary while UN arms inspectors were still searching Iraq for weapons 
of mass destruction.121  This diplomatic opposition led U.S. Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld to dismiss French and German insistence that everything must be done to avoid 
war with Iraq, saying that most European Countries stand with the United States in its 
campaign against Saddam Hussein.  “Germany and France represent ‘old Europe’, stated 
Rumsfeld, “and NATO’s expansion in recent years means ‘the center of gravity is 
shifting to the East.’” 122  Europe was now split between “Old” and “New”, as France and 
Germany would attempt to align opposition to U.S. foreign policy, while Washington 
gathered allies from the periphery of the continent and within nations that had formerly 
comprised the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Against the Franco-German “Maginot 
Line” of diplomatic intransigence, the Bush administration would launch an “Ideological 
Blitzkrieg”, resulting in a callus disregard for any institutional legitimacy that the U.N. 
possessed as a security actor, as well as significant collateral damage to the working 
relationship of the Allies within NATO.  As the U.S. and the opposition aligned their 
supporters the stage would be set for transatlantic discord and its spillover in Europe. 
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1. The United States Disregards the Security Council  
Unconvinced that Saddam Hussein was cooperating fully with UN inspections, 
and increasingly frustrated with diplomatic delays by multinational negotiations, the 
United States proceeded with their predetermined goals.  When the Bush administration 
tried to secure a second UN Security Council Resolution authorizing force against Iraq, 
the U.S. policy was threatened with a French veto in the Security Council.  While their 
ally Britain pursued the second resolution, the U.S. discovered that the geographic 
composition of the Security Council favored the opposition, as the measure could not 
even obtain a majority of the council members.  Therefore, the U.S would not be able to 
claim any sort of moral authority as a mandate for military action.123  Faced with this 
multilateral opposition, the second resolution measure was withdrawn and U.S. would 
chose to act upon the existing resolutions, in effect disregarding the legitimacy of the 
United Nations and the U.N. Security Council.  On 16 March 2003, at the Azores Summit 
in conjunction with its coalition partners Britain and Spain, President Bush issuing an 
ultimatum that, “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours, and that 
their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our 
choosing.”124   
On 17 March 2003 President Bush stated that, “The United Nations Security 
Council has not lived up to its responsibilities…so we will rise to ours.”125   Once again, 
the U.S. would proceed unilaterally, considering the ideology espoused in the NSS 
superior to the principles and common values espoused by the United Nations Charter or 
NATO’s Washington Treaty.  The United States had rejected the classic international law 
definition of pre-emption based on imminent danger of an attack by proclaiming the right 
to ‘anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and 
place of the enemy’s attack.126   By proceeding unilaterally on its predetermined goals, 
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the founding principles of international law were thus considered sorely inadequate by 
the world’s greatest military power.127   
This position put a tremendous strain not only on the UN’s role in international 
security, but on NATO’s as a security actor as well.  During NATO’s Prague Summit, the 
19 member nations had issued a statement calling on Iraq to, “comply with UN Security 
Council Resolution 1441 and all relevant UN Security Council resolutions.”128  While 
warning Iraq that they would face severe consequences as a result of their continued 
violations of its obligations, NATO as a multilateral institution was committed to 
working within the auspices of the UN.  When the resistance of France and Germany 
within the U.N. stymied efforts to institutionally legitimize U.S. foreign policy goals in 
the international community, this subsequently prevented the U.S. from using NATO for 
these purposes as well.  Correctly interpreting that there was enough resistance inherent 
within the NATO Alliance to prevent a consensus, the U.S. once again chose to by-pass 
the institution in the execution of expeditionary operations, albeit towards a preemptive, 
unilateral objective.  “Coalitions of the willing” were continuing to be the tool of choice 
in order to provide the means of implementing U.S. foreign policy, especially since the 
United States military had the capability to support, makeup or overcome technological 
or resource shortfalls within the contributing forces of small, but compliant coalition 
partners.   
2. Friction Permeates NATO (2002 – 2003) 
Having been trivialized in one supranational institution, France and Germany 
would not be cooperative in NATO either, resisting U.S. efforts to utilize the institution 
in a strategic and political measure of security for Turkey.  As the U.S. proceeded closer 
to war with Iraq, the United States tried to gain NATO Article 5 assurances for Turkey in 
the event of an attack by Iraq.  But by doing so, France, Germany and Belgium insistence 
that defensive assistance to Turkey would be tantamount to acknowledgement that war 
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was necessary and imminent at a time when U.N. inspections were still under way.129  
With the embarked equipment of the 4th U.S. infantry division (4ID) positioned in the 
Mediterranean Sea, this contributed to the appearance that that the U.S. was trying to 
influence Turkey in order to open a second front against Iraq, not deter or defend against 
an aggressor or an imminent threat to an alliance member.  
The self-interests of the member nations were playing havoc with the Alliance’s 
principle of collective security.  “If France or Germany or any other power can block 
Alliance planning for assistance to a long-standing NATO ally, such as Turkey (and 
disregard NATO's Article 5), then an Alliance reaction to a more sever potential threat 
could prove even more timid.’130  Furthermore, to ask Turkey to directly challenge 
Saddam Hussein in this next stage of the war against terrorism would confront the 
Turkish government with very difficult decisions.  The first dilemma would be one of 
reversing an accelerated trend of normalizing relations with Iraq and recouping some of 
the enormous economic costs that the continuing embargos against Baghdad where 
costing the country.131  The second would be encouraging stronger recognition of 
Kurdish elements in Iraq which would have a spillover effect in Turkey.   
With these considerations aside, due to the inherent weakness of institutions that 
require obtaining consensus as opposed to majority approval, the actions of a few nations 
within NATO were frustrating the intentions of its most powerful member.  But this 
resistance would fail to prevent action by the United States, and would subsequently 
promote further divisiveness in Europe and within the Alliance.   As the U.S. was about 
to demonstrate, despite the resistance of select members within NATO, the United States 
wielded a considerable amount of influence in Europe.  The U.S. would garner support 
from nations that shared their views of Iraq’s role in the War on Terror, desired the 
continued or improved support from Washington, or were suspicious of the self-interests 
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of the larger European nations that comprised the opposition.  The realignment of Europe 
along the position of Washington’s foreign policy, and in effect, the ideology of the NSS, 
would have negative repercussions within Europe, and the European Union, as the Bush 
administration prepared to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
D. THE EFFECTS OF UNILATERALISM:  INVASION, INTRANSIGENCE 
AND INSURGENCY (2003 – 2004) 
By deciding to go to war against Iraq with few supporters and on a false rationale, 
the Bush administration took a big gamble – effectively making success in Iraq a test of 
its entire foreign policy.132  In the early weeks after America’s triumphant and indeed 
impressive military success against the crumbling forces of Saddam Hussein, there was a 
fleeting moment when a new and very different international system was imaginable, 
with the United States at the center; international institutions would serve only to transmit 
U.S. influence, international alliances would be reduced to U.S. military appendices.133 
NATO, the backbone of the transatlantic partnership, looked to once again becoming 
“merely a toolbox for an American agenda to which allies have to submit or run the risk 
of being ignored.”134  
1. Difficulties in Post-Conflict Stabilization and Installing Democracy  
Despite weak evidence of an imminent threat, the lack of a UN mandate and the 
political opposition and resistance of several industrialized nations, the United States 
succeeded in occupying Baghdad and toppling the Iraqi regime in six weeks.135  But the 
ensuing failure to locate WMD within Iraq would continue debate among the Allies over 
the legitimacy of any potential post-conflict role for NATO.  This eliminated any 
possibility of duplicating an expeditionary out-of-area stabilization mission such as the 
Alliance executed after major combat operations ceased in Afghanistan.  A lack of 
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consensus in the Alliance had sidelined any immediate involvement by NATO in 
stabilization efforts in the Iraq, and would limit the institution’s initial involvement to 
peripheral and indirect support.  
The next phase of the U.S. strategy in Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion 
focused on providing security, stability and the structures necessary to establish a 
democratic, multiethnic Iraqi government.  This active implementation of the “Wolfowitz 
Doctrine” envisioned a utopian spread of the ideals of democratic transformation through 
the Middle East, promoting the creation of further democratic institutions, which in turn 
would stabilize the region.136 But the vacuum and chaos created within Iraq by the 
overthrow of the Hussein regime, the collapse of internal security, and the emergence of 
an intensive and violent insurgency created an environment in which accomplishing this 
lofty objective would be far more complicated and involved.  The immediate reality of 
post-war Iraq would be “a classic guerrilla-type campaign” involving former regime 
members, self-interested ethnic factions, foreign fighters and the al Qaeda terrorists of an 
intensity and scale that would severely challenge the capabilities of the U.S.-led coalition 
to provide the security necessary to establish democracy in Iraq.137 
2. The Toll of the Occupation on U.S. Capabilities 
The post-conflict insurgency had become more difficult to sustain than was 
projecting enough American military power to conduct the “regime change”.  American 
technology was being frustrated by asymmetric, low-tech methods such as improvised 
explosives, ambushes, car bombings and the use of suicide bombers.  Influential to these 
conditions was the instable environment that promoted the insurgency and the influence 
of internal ethnic factional violence and foreign fighters and terrorists.  With the removal 
of the Hussein regime, the sectarian and tribal divisions within the country, as well as 
there being no rooted legacy of representative government within the society promoted a 
rapid spread of protests, confrontations and attacks against U.S., coalition and provisional 
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Iraqi forces by insurgents.  In addition, the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq was increasing 
overall anti-U.S. sentiments in Muslim countries.138  While the NSS had provided 
effective guidance to enact an interventionist foreign policy, European methods were 
predicting the challenges and difficulties that such a policy would have establishing a 
long-term peace.  Washington had both ignored and confirmed European warnings by 
invading Iraq without clear multinational support and was now plummeted into a 
quagmire of nation-building.139  It was now apparent that it was easier to have removed 
the regime than it would be to establish a secure environment, multiethnic cooperation, 
Iraqi self-rule and a lasting peace afterwards.   
In order to deal with a mounting insurgency and increasing instability, the United 
States was required to maintain a large occupation force in Iraq.  U.S. forces had hoped to 
be reduced to about 110,000 in 2004, with about 20,000 additional support personnel in 
the region; however, the instable environment and the frustrations of installing effective 
Iraqi security structures led the Department of Defense to increase the in-country troop 
level to 141,000 in November 2004, with a projected increase to 160,000 for the Iraqi 
elections scheduled for January 2005. 140  This was in addition to 25,000 non-U.S. troops 
also in theater, with Britain, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy and Ukraine being the largest 
contributors at that time.141    
The results of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the lack of substantial international 
support were suggesting that U.S. ground forces in particular were stretched thin in the 
region.  While the combat phase was won with fewer divisions than expected, the 
occupation phase initially involved over 220,000 U.S. forces in country or supporting 
from surrounding regions.  In March 2004, the U.S. military would be involved in the 
“largest troop rotation since World War Two” as forces rotated for year-long tours in 
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Iraq.142  Soon, many of the units and individuals would be returning for subsequent tours, 
with over one third of the U.S. occupation forces having been involved in the invasion 
one year previously. 
The reserve capacity of the United States was also being over utilized, as almost 
one third of the U.S. occupation force would be comprised of Reserve and National 
Guard Forces.143  This effort could not be maintained indefinitely utilizing U.S reserve 
forces because of the operational tempo required in Iraq due to the insurgency and the 
post-conflict reconstruction requirements.  The activation requirements necessary to 
mobilize forces for the stabilization efforts in Iraq left the United States without a true 
strategic reserve capacity to deal with a major regional conflict when reserve forces are 
being utilized to sustain on-going operations.144  
The capabilities necessary to sustain the occupation were being forecast as early 
as January 2004, when U.S. Department of Defense planners authorized a temporary 
increase of 30,000 personnel in the end-strength of the military, particularly for Army 
and Marine Corps units.145 Further house and senate measures were calling for 
permanent increases to U.S. military forces, as well, in response to the extended tours and 
requirements in Iraq.  Clearly, the lack of additional support from the international 
community was having an effect on the vaulted U.S. capability as well.  The strain on the 
U.S. military was demonstrating the limitations of a unilateralist strategy:  a sustained 
international stabilization effort could not be maintained by a post-cold war force 
structure without the support on the international community.  A coalition to build peace 
must be substantially broader than a coalition to conduct war146 The United States was 
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learning that in order to achieve the broad support necessary for sustained stability 
operations, was that they would be required to obtain a consensus within a multilateral 
security institution, or at least acknowledging the security role these organizations play in 
international relations.   The U.S. could not sustain the on-going stability operation in 
Iraq without increasing the size of their military forces or enlisting the support of 
additional European and international peacekeepers. 
E. THE COSTS OF UNILATERALISM:  DAMAGE TO MULTINATIONAL 
COOPERATION AND U.S. CREDIBILITY (2003 – 2004)   
The United States begins to feel the absence substantial European participation in 
coalition reconstruction and security efforts as the costs of the Iraq occupation rise. The 
inability to discover the WMD that was the premise for the U.S. invasion and frustration 
with the growing insurgency that was hindering implementation of the Wolfowitz 
Doctrine was having an effect within the coalition and would have further implications 
for NATO members and in implementing a post-conflict role for Alliance.  Now that the 
invasion and occupation were fait accompli, the subsequent frustration concerning the 
Alliance was that an unstable Iraq was an unsettling force in an already volatile Middle 
East.147  The growing insurgency also lent credence to skepticism that the United States 
could successfully install a multi-ethnic democratic institution in Iraq and thus prevent 
erosion and division within the country along sectarian and tribal lines.  Many of the 
Allies believed that this instability would have a spill-over effect towards settling Israeli -
Palestinian issues in the Middle East as well, upon which Europe placed a strategic 
priority and a higher importance than a war with Iraq.148  
1. Strategic Effects of the Madrid Bombings (March – July 2004) 
Of immediate effect upon the Alliance and the coalition was the al Qaeda 
bombing in Madrid on 11 March 2004. Spain, one of America’s most steadfast allies in 
Iraq and one of the top foreign troop contributors with 1,300 personnel, suffered a 
terrorist bombing in Madrid on 11 March 2004 resulting in 190 dead and 1500 injured in 
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the nation’s capital. 149   Three days later, in scheduled national elections, the ruling 
Popular Party government was replaced by a Socialist majority in Parliament in what was 
seen as a protest vote in combination of opposition to the government’s support of the 
U.S. in Iraq and the view that the Spanish government was deliberately manipulative in 
mislabeling the perpetrators as Basque Separatists rather than al Qaeda terrorists.150  The 
incoming Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Zapatero, immediately pledged to withdraw 
Spanish troops from Iraq unless the UN “took control” and the “occupiers give up 
political control”(sic).  
Despite any flexibility in Spain’s stated position, the U.N. was not prepared to 
take control in Iraq in the midst of an active insurgency.  As early as September 2003, 
President Bush had been calling on the United Nations to take greater control of post-war 
Iraq.151  The U.N. Security Council had passed Resolution 1500, mandating the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on August 14 2004.152  But on August 
19th, the mission headquarters in Baghdad suffered a major terrorist bombing, killing 23 
United Nations personnel, including the head of the mission.153  The U.N. subsequently 
withdrew much of their headquarters from Iraq, though it continued to support the 
mission through a headquarters in Amman, Jordan.  Nevertheless, the security of UNMI 
staff in Iraq would remain the overriding constraint for all UN operations in Iraq, and the 
agency would limit their activities only to “essential tasks.”154  With the U.N. unable to  
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take a more prominent role in stability operations in Iraq, loss of Spanish support for the 
coalition was assured.  Spain would withdraw from the coalition and remove their troops 
from Iraq in July 2004. 
The loss of Spain to the coalition changed the alignment of the rift and the 
dynamics of NATO as well.  The Zapatero Socialist government in Madrid quickly 
aligned with France and Germany, strengthening a continental block towards opposition 
from the Anglo-American and Eastern European elements in Iraq. Expressing a desire to 
work with the French and German leaders to develop a new UN framework to end the 
American occupation of Iraq and calling for greater European unity, Zapatero stated, 
"There is no 'old' or 'new' Europe, but one Europe that, to be heard, must speak with a 
single voice and act with a single hand."155 NATO’s plans to play a greater role in Iraq 
had been thrown into jeopardy as Spain had been due to replace Poland in command of 
Southern Iraq on 1 July.156   
Further damage to American credibility would continue as additional coalition 
members withdrew, or chose not to renew their missions or support within the 
Multinational Force. While the coalition in July still consisted of 29 contributing nations 
providing approximately 25,000 forces, of these, Britain and Poland were contributing 
over 10,000 troops.157 Critics of the “international” effort could point out that U.S. forces 
comprised 85% of the troops in Iraq by October 2004.  
In a further attempt to satisfy the requirements of several of the major nations, 
such as France, for a greater U.N. role in post-Saddam Iraq, the United States obtained 
agreement on further U.N resolutions authorizing a “multinational force under unified 
command.  However, some major potential force contributors as France, Russia, India 
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and Pakistan have viewed these resolutions as insufficient to prompt their involvement on 
the grounds that they did not end what these countries perceived as a U.S. monopoly of 
decision making on Iraq policy.158 Efforts to “internationalize” the post-Saddam 
reconstruction of Iraq were still being stymied by the obstinacy of the international 
community and NATO alliance members in opposition to U.S. foreign policy and in 
response to the Unilateralist policies of the administration.    
2. NATO Stymied:  Continuing Discord Prevents a Substantial Out-of-
Area Role for the Alliance 
NATO as an organization had no role in the decision to undertake the campaign 
or in its conduct, which was executed by a coalition force; some were member countries 
of the Alliance, and others were not.  In response to a request from Turkey in February 
2003 for assistance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance undertook a 
number of precautionary defensive measures to ensure Turkey’s security in the event of a 
potential threat to its territory or population.159  After intense consultations and 
intransigence by both supporters and opponents of America’s foreign policy towards Iraq, 
NATO’s Defense Planning Committee approved Operation Display Deterrence, sending 
AWACs and air defense missiles to protect Turkey, for missions that would be solely 
defensive in nature.160  After the start of combat operations on 20 March 2003, the 
Defense Planning Committee strengthened the rules of engagement for NATO forces in 
Turkey, but still maintained a purely defensive posture.  At the same time, the Defense 
Planning Committee was discussing humanitarian and post-conflict issues with its NATO 
Allies and Partners within the U.S.-led coalition.161  On 16 April 2003, Operation 
Display Deterrence was concluded, and the last NATO elements left Turkey on 3 May 
2003.   
While not contributing directly to the coalition, NATO was supporting Polish 
forces conducting stabilization missions in Iraq, agreeing to a request from the Polish 
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representative to provide support on 2 June 2003.  When Poland assumed command of 
the Multinational Division in Central South Iraq in September 2003, NATO pledged to 
continue its support, consisting of staff and logistics planning, movement coordination, 
secure communications and intelligence sharing.  With on-going NATO operations in the 
Balkans and Afghanistan, NATO’s support for Poland was a continuing contribution to 
non-article 5, out-of-area missions for the Alliance.   
The U.S. had hoped for a more robust presence in IRAQ, hoping for that NATO 
might take over the command of the multinational force, depending on what kind of 
mandate the Alliance received from the UN.162  But the withdrawal of Spanish troops 
from the coalition after the March 2004 change of government had changed the dynamic, 
as Spain was to be the chief NATO advocate for such a plan.163  Therefore, assistance to 
Poland as an Alliance member would remain the extent of NATO’s involvement in Iraq, 
when in June 2004 NATO would undertake an out-of-area mission at the request of the 
new interim Iraqi government before the Istanbul Summit. 
F. EUROPE EMERGES FROM DISCORD A NEWLY FOCUSED 
SECURITY ACTOR 
While the principles and values espoused within NATO, the UN and the EU 
coincided with the NSS, the unilateralist and preemptive methods used to implement the 
foreign policy goals of the “Wolfowitz Doctrine” and Bush Administration caused a 
divisive rift in Europe as well.  European diplomatic resistance to U.S. foreign policy, 
based on an opposition to these methods conflict of principles and methods, was equally 
disastrous towards efforts by the EU towards becoming an effective military actor.  
Though able to stymie efforts of increased participation by the international community 
and by the NATO alliance, the French and German-led opposition could not provide an 
effective alternative policy and strategy, or a common position, for opponents of U.S. 
unilateralism to unite behind.  The smaller members of the EU resisted efforts by the 
larger members to promote a policy because they were suspicious of the larger nation’s 
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intent and were resentful of the high-handed bullying that was similar U.S. behavior 
towards ‘old’ Europe.   Furthermore, the smaller countries were not prepared or capable  
of funding the costs of replicating security institutions necessary to implement a 
European Security Strategy and to create a military capability completely independent 
from NATO and the U.S.164  
1. Europe Asunder and Reconciled 
Shortly after the Iraq war started, European discord was as pronounced as that in 
the transatlantic rift.  When France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg announced 
plans for a European military headquarters at the Brussels summit in April 2003, those 
governments that had supported the Iraq war, such as Britain, saw this move as an 
attempt to create a core Europe that would exclude the more Atlanticist countries and 
undermine NATO.165  The rift at Brussels April 2003 EU summit projected the lack of 
unity within Europe, as the lack of direction and purpose result from opposition to U.S. 
foreign policy made Europe seem rudderless in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, and 
pleased those in Washington who wished Europe to remain split so that it could not 
become an effective international security actor. Early 2003 was probably the low point 
in modern times for the ambitions of the European Union as a global actor in the field of 
foreign affairs and security.166  
Though the EU leaders viewed ESPD as an integral element of European 
integration, the Iraq crisis had resulted in an increased focused towards accelerating its 
development.  The Iraq crisis has also provided further evidence that the EU has inherent 
difficulties dealing with any form of “robust” out-of-area intervention in the absence of a 
UN mandate; and that EU countries are under great strain when the United States builds 
ad hoc coalitions: This twin dilemma is decisive for the future of CFSP and the ability of 
the Europeans to contribute to (and help shape) potential interventions.167  
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The EU’s progress towards ESDP and CFSP continued to be haphazard until mid 
2003, with the polarization of Europe highlighting the regions’ military weakness and 
dysfunction.  In May 2003, the EU declared that the rapid reaction force possessed the 
capability to accomplish the full range of “Petersberg Tasks”, but recognized that the 
force would still be limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls in certain defense 
capabilities.  But in June 2003, the first two steps would be taken towards reconciliation 
within Europe and towards improving the EU’s role as a global security actor.   
The first of these steps would be a demonstration of military independence and 
expeditionary capability in the conduct of European crisis management operations when 
the EU executed Operation Artemis; a peacekeeping mission in the Congo.  The second, 
and more encompassing event would be a cooperative and conciliatory mending of the 
polarization in Europe through the development and adoption of the European Security 
Strategy (ESS). The results of these developments within ESDP would implement the 
first tentative steps towards establishing a credible EU expeditionary capability, and 
defining the unique requirements of transforming a European Security Identity into an 
effective strategy.  Also, these definitive measures would work towards repairing the 
transatlantic rift and reestablishing a working relationship between the United States and 
the European Union through the auspices of NATO and CFSP.   
In June 2003, the EU deployed an international peacekeeping force of 1400 
troops, Operation Artemis, to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that sought to 
stop rebel fighting and protect aid workers.  An Interim Emergency Multinational Force 
was requested by the United Nations Security Council in May 2003 and would be fielded 
by the European Union with France in a “lead nation” capacity.168  This force would be 
charged with stabilizing the situation in the DRC until the United Nations took over the 
mission in September. This opportunity allowed for Europe to begin demonstrating and 
refining both an independent expeditionary capability with regard to European crisis 
management operations, and in pursuing an out-of-area security strategy.  The Congo was 
farther geographically than it had been thought that the EU would decide to become 
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involved or to project their forces. Also surprising to NATO Allies was that Operation 
Artemis would be planned and executed without recourse to NATO assets.   This aspect 
allowed further independence because the EU was not required to request NATO assets 
(and therefore permission) to undertake the mission or to offer a right of refusal to the 
Alliance.169  When the mission was completed in September 2003, Operation Artimis 
would demonstrate the potential for a new EU out-of-area model with Brussels political 
leadership, operational command through streamlined national command authority and a 
coalition of willing and able military forces within Europe. 
2. Defining European’s Vision: The European Security Strategy (2003)  
The adoption of the ESS would represent a significant milestone towards 
repairing European discord, and would represent a diplomatic victory for a united Europe 
and invigorate ESDP, while working towards closing the military capabilities and 
ideology gaps, at least in principle.  When Javier Solana presented his strategy paper to 
the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003, his work would outline a concept 
that would establish the basis for a security strategy that could encompass distinctly 
European elements, and could therefore be adopted, and implemented, within the 
multilateral framework of the European Union. “Europe has never been so prosperous, so 
secure and so free,” Javier Solana would state in June 2003, “The violence of the first 
half of the 20th century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in 
European history.”170  This introduction would serve as the preamble for the European 
Security Strategy (ESS) that would be adopted in Brussels in December 2003.171  The 
ESS would establish three key objectives for the EU:  contributing to stability and good 
governance in Europe’s immediate neighborhood, building an international order based 
on effective multilateralism, and how to address the old and new security threats to 
Europe.   
In addition to these stated objectives, the ESS would also definitively outline the 
differences between European and American perspectives in the War on terror, the 
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security environment and expeditionary interventions.  The EU and the United States 
have distinct political cultures and consequently different ways of dealing with 
international crises.172 Therefore, defining the differences would make it possible (in 
theory) to better understand inherent differences towards security in order to develop the 
means to implement a cooperative effort towards addressing them, such as was done in 
the Washington Treaty and in Article 5.  If the U.S. and the EU were able to utilize 
NATO as a successful deterrent against the Soviet Union, it could be possible for these 
security actors to utilize the institution to implement an expeditionary, out-of-area 
security strategy that they both acknowledge and advocate. 
The publication of the ESS would also represent a consensus of European 
attitudes and adoption of a common policy necessary for an independent capability for 
European out-of-area operations.173 As opposed to solely the “soft power” vs. “hard 
power” comparison between Europe and American, the ESS would describe how and in 
what circumstances Europe’s power could actually be used, and how an expanded union 
of 25 members could exercise global responsibility commensurate with its economic 
weight and ambitions.174  In defining and accepting a security strategy, Europe was now 
doing more than reflecting in depth on possible threats beyond the continent; they were 
trying to adopt methods to prevent them.  
The ESS views the security environment differently from the NSS; it is one of 
Europe having achieved its greatest level of security since the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
Europe is not in crisis, but in consolidation.  While conditions exist that encourage threats 
to European security, a long-term multilateral strategy of prevention and involvement 
will seek to promote the stability that the US advocates through the force of arms. There 
is no general preference in Europe for military intervention, or the political or financial 
motivation or means to develop an expeditionary capability of significance to the point of 
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challenging the United States dominance in this realm.175  But European military 
capabilities will be expanded to the point of executing a strategy of prolonged conflict 
prevention, while maintaining the means to accomplish an occasional ‘robust 
intervention’. Whereas the NSS often actively promotes military intervention, or at least 
its implicit threat, the ESS would leave the non-permissive military response as an 
undesirable and regrettable final option.  European foreign policy objectives differ in that 
they focus upon continuing international engagement based upon preventive vs. 
preemptive action.  This preference for preventive action promotes long-term 
involvement, encompassing multiple facets of diplomatic, economic, humanitarian 
assistance, and only when all else fails, military intervention. 
Because the EU is committed to a multilateral approach to international relations 
and diplomacy, the ESS depends on utilizing international organizations, strategic 
partnerships, and international cooperation, as well as engaging the United Nations as the 
fundamental framework for international relations.  The ESS acknowledges that the 
United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.176  This is in stark contrast to the present American 
penchant for independent action or towards forming coalitions of the willing in order to 
accomplish unilaterist intentions.  The ESS does not see a possibility to act effectively 
without partners.  Achieving unity of purpose and cohesion through recognizing and 
utilizing international institutions, including NATO, is a major principle in the European 
Security Strategy. 
The element that unites the strategies is the realization that, due to the changing 
nature of security threats, defense will require an expeditionary capability and an out-of-
area involvement; the first line of defense will be abroad.177  While not accepting the 
necessity for preemptive engagement promoted by Javier Solana and practiced by the 
United States, the ESS acknowledges that Europe must be in a state of readiness to act 
before a crisis occurs.  “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, 
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and when necessary robust intervention”178 The ESS further acknowledged the 
requirement to conduct multiple sustained expeditionary military and civilian operations 
simultaneously, promoting a more active and continuous out-of-area role for European 
foreign policy. 
By the end of 2003, France and Germany realized that they could not build a 
Common Security and Defense Policy, nor a European Security and Defense Policy, 
without the help of Britain.  And Britain decided that it could not fulfill its ambitions in 
Europe without repairing the rift with France and Germany.  This reconciliation allowed 
the European Union to present a more united stance to the rest of the world, while 
subsequently allowing the “Big Three” to guide the EU once it had enlarged to 25 
countries.179  As a result, France and Germany toned down their requirements for a 
European military headquarters while Britain acknowledged the necessity for such an 
organization.  This consensual agreement upon a European military headquarters would 
establish the initial accord necessary to accomplish further cooperative security goals in 
Europe that would complement, rather than compete with NATO, while having a 
distinctly European identity, and would be attainable with limited defense budgets of the 
member nations, and within multilateral institutional constraints of the EU.  
G. CONCLUSION:  THE ROAD TO ISTANBUL (2004) 
Had the United States succeeded in its attempts to install a functional democracy 
and create a secure, stable environment in Iraq after removing the Saddam regime, it 
would have emerged as the world’s sole authority of interventionist security.  However, 
due to the fact that neither weapons of mass destruction nor links between international 
terrorism and Saddam Hussein were discovered, the necessity of abrogating the 
legitimacy of the United Nations and the principles of the international community in 
order to intervene in Iraq was widely questioned. Clearly the threat neither warranted, nor 
required, such a response.  The invasion of Iraq was a war of choice for America.180  
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Consequently, the damage to American credibility is such that it will be difficult to gain 
international support for subsequent interventions outside of established multinational 
institutions.  
While the Transatlantic Alliance experienced the repercussions of the United 
States’ unilateralist foreign policy, Europe suffered as well.  The loyalty, shared 
convictions, as well as opportune strategic and economic advantages of supporting 
United States foreign policy were stronger for those further away from the Europe’s 
established economic, political and military “core.” Choosing alignment with, or against, 
United States foreign policy polarized European nations, highlighting a lack of unity and 
consensus towards expeditionary interventions, security strategy and the commitments 
necessary to implement ESDP. 
But European discord also affected the U.S.-led post-conflict coalition in Iraq.  
Despite the lack of WMD or proof of Saddam Hussein’s link to terrorist organizations, 
the most urgent issues in America’s Iraq foreign policy are the inability to: stop a 
persistent insurgency, promote and establish domestic security and stability, and to 
effectively train and employ sufficient Iraqi security forces to ensure the authority of the 
newly elected Iraqi Parliament.  While additional European personnel support is not a 
panacea for U.S. and coalition difficulties on the ground in Iraq, a substantial influx of 
experienced peacekeepers with a focus towards civil-military affairs and police duties 
would certainly be appreciated by the coalition in light of the instable situation.  Also, a 
robust role for NATO in post conflict Iraq would help to restore NATO’s unity and 
effectiveness as an expeditionary security actor, as well as install further international 
legitimacy to the stabilization effort, especially since the U.N. involvement has been 
limited.    
Having learned the difficulties of operating apart, the Allies were ready to begin a 
process of reconciliation at the NATO Istanbul Summit in June 2004.  Attempts would be 
made to increase the role of NATO in post-conflict Iraq and to reengage the Alliance as 
an expeditionary out-of-area security actor.  The Istanbul Summit would give further 
shape and direction towards adapting NATO’s structures, procedures and capabilities to 
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21st Century challenges.181  Furthermore, the summit would represent an opportunity to 
mend the transatlantic rift, reaffirming the commitment to shared purposes and principles.  
In order to reestablish their out-of area security focus, NATO’s Allies would have to 
reestablish the cooperation essential in defending the common values, and in meeting the 
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V. NATO 2004 – PRESENT:  ISTANBUL AND BEYOND - THE 
FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC OUT-OF-AREA COOPERATION  
What binds us are the values…We will have differences of opinion … but 
there is a lot more that we agree upon, and that is the bottom line and the 
basis for this great Alliance.  
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
A. INTRODUCTION   
Despite the discord resulting from the transatlantic rift, all the member nations of 
NATO believed that the present security situation was too serious to permit internal 
quarrels to leave the Alliance divided and adrift.  In the aftermath of the bitter flare-up 
over Iraq, a period of calm had settled over relations within the Alliance.  While some 
believed that the best path to reconciliation was to do nothing, the member nations 
instead proceeded with continuing communications intending to redefine the transatlantic 
relationship post-Iraq while encouraging further cooperative security in out-of-area 
engagements.   
The Allies on both sides of the Iraq issue were willing to be conciliatory and were 
prepared to reestablish the relationship.  The discord had proved humbling for both sides 
of the rift as the negative effects of the polarizing discord demonstrated the complexity of 
the interrelationship and the interdependence of NATO’s post-Cold War security 
requirements, as well as the cooperation necessary to maintain a sustained forward 
defense focus.  
The Allies needed each other, for the benefits of cooperation outweighed the 
freedoms of positions of unilateral action or disengagement.  The U.S. had an 
unparalleled technological and expeditionary capability in its armed forces, and Europe 
had the history of long-term engagements in conflict prevention as well as a large 
manpower contribution of experienced peacekeepers that would be available for extended 
stability operations under the correct circumstances.182  For the U.S., the costs in 
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manpower and materials of conducting extended out-of-area operations independently or 
with few coalition members are too great to maintain indefinitely.  Within Europe, the 
lack of a defined and unifying defense concept and security strategy had left the nations 
of the European Union divided, leaderless and vulnerable to further internal political 
schisms, as well as to external security threats.   
Having suffered through an unfortunate, but necessary, divide over threat 
assessments, implementing forward defense, and security issues, the members of the 
Alliance now were ready to work together again with renewed focus towards a common 
out-of-area expeditionary security strategy. The forum for this reconciliation would be 
NATO’s Istanbul Summit in June 2004.  NATO would also use this reconciliation 
opportunity to reestablish the momentum towards the transformation process that was 
initially begun at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002 by readdressing these issues at 
Istanbul.  The Transatlantic Alliance, and its role as an out-of-area security actor would 
survive.   
B. THE ISTANBUL SUMMIT (JUNE 2004) 
The Istanbul Summit would serve as an opportunity to reinforce the importance of 
security cooperation between Europe and North America, and the Allies commitment to 
maintain NATO – the embodiment of the transatlantic link – as their central institution 
for collective defense, security consultation, as well as crisis management and 
multinational military actions.183  The results of the summit included an expansion of the 
scope and nature of Alliance out-of-area operations; adopting measures to continue 
improving member nation’s military capabilities; and endorsed initiatives to enhance 
relations with existing partners and to forge relations with new ones. 
1. Commitment to Cooperation, Transformation and Forward Defense 
At Istanbul, the Allies would agree to strengthen NATO’s contribution to the fight 
against terrorism, dedicate to international efforts towards limiting the proliferation of 
WMD, and to expand NATO’s operational role in out-of-area engagements, such as in 
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Afghanistan.184  The transformation and modernization of European military forces was 
also a center of focus as the Alliance recognized that this effort would be a long term 
endeavor, and that it must continue for NATO be able to carry out the full range of its 
missions, including combating the threats posed by terrorism, failed states and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).   Specific commitments were also 
made at the Summit that would ensure the Alliance a permanently available pool of 
dedicated assets and forces that could be deployed on rapid response missions and 
expeditionary interventions.  These dedicated commitments were important in that they 
enabled the NRF to go from a concept to an initial operational capability in October 
2004, providing a dependable, operational force that provided NATO with a crisis 
response capability with true war-fighting capabilities able to accomplish the full range of 
NATO missions.185  Also, in a sign that significant differences over Iraq could, if not be 
forgiven, then be set aside, all 26 Allies would agree to support NATO’s training mission 
of Iraqi security forces, as well as continuing to assist Poland in their leadership of the 
Multinational Division in South-central Iraq.186   
2. Continued Involvement Out-of Area for Forward Defense 
The Alliance made provisions to continue their involvement in the Balkans, as 
their engagement progressed and evolved into a long-term peace engagement and conflict 
prevention police mission. In Bosnia, the Alliance would bring its 9-year direct 
involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the first peacekeeping operation in its history – 
to a conclusion at the end of 2004.  From a high of 60,000 troops that were deployed to 
the region for the first year under NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995, the 
total forces deemed necessary at the end of the mission would be fewer than 7,000, 
serving as a testament to the stability established in the region over the eight-year tenure 
of the Stabilization Force (SFOR).  NATO will continue to support the new stabilization 
force in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the operational command of the EU in 
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accordance with the “Berlin Plus” agreements.187  While in Kosovo, NATO continued to 
maintain command of a robust military presence under the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to 
enhance security in the region and promote the political process.  Other NATO measures 
would focus on a political agenda to promote greater security in the Middle East and to 
support the Peace Process and the resolution of the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. 
3. The Middle East Peace Process, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was established in 1994 with Egypt, 
Israel Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia in order to contribute to regional security and 
stability, to achieve a better mutual understanding, and to correct any misperceptions 
about NATO among MD countries.188  Jordan in 1995 and Algeria in 2000 would also 
join the MD as participants.  After numerous fits and starts due to the complications of 
the Israeli/Palestinian Peace Process, the decision was agreed at Istanbul between NATO 
and the participating countries to undertake a more ambitious and expanded framework, 
elevating the MD to a genuine partnership along the example of NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace.189  This partnership would contribute towards regional security through practical 
cooperation by enhancing existing political dialogue, achieving interoperability, 
developing defense reform, and contributing to the fight against terrorism. Further 
diplomatic cooperation with a broader region of countries in the Middle East would be 
initiated at the summit with the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.190 
Through the agenda of the Istanbul Summit, the Alliance demonstrated a dynamic 
involvement in forward defense measures and cooperative out-of-area security.  After 
more than half a century, NATO was finally turning into a framework for transatlantic 
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action wherever the security interests of the Alliance demanded it.191 Further catalysts for 
military transformation within the Alliance would facilitate NATO’s new focus of 
projecting stability, forward defense and out-of-area engagement.  
C. BEYOND ISTANBUL: NATO OUT-OF-AREA ENGAGEMENTS  
The opportunity for renewed cooperation has now been opened by the Istanbul 
Summit.  The significant differences within the Alliance over Iraq have not prevented all 
26 Allies from contributing to NATO’s training of Iraqi security forces, either in Iraq, 
outside of Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment.192  Though 
this involvement is encouraging, there are still remnants of discord within the Alliance, 
and a desire to balance U.S. foreign policy, as NATO still has only the limited role of a 
training mission in Iraq.193  The limitations of this role, and in particular the resistance of 
France and Germany, prevent NATO from assuming a more ambitious role that 
potentially could have included command of the Multinational Force.194  A responsibility 
of this size would have engaged the Alliance in an out-of-area forward security mission 
on the scale of IFOR’s intervention in Bosnia in 1995.  This responsibility would have 
changed the dynamics of out-of-area involvement for NATO, and Europe in particular, 
for the Alliance would have been executing its full range of missions, from stabilization 
and peacekeeping, to combat operations.  NATO’s command in the volatile and 
controversial mission that has been at the center of world attention since 2003, and in 
addition to the Afghanistan, would have significantly increased NATO’s prestige in the 
international community in the aftermath of the transatlantic rift, and would have further 
maintained the Alliance as the most relevant, active, and experienced security actor in the 
international community.  The dramatic increase in troop, material and financial 
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contributions to the institution would have further legitimized multilateral security 
institutions as the instrument of choice in a forward defense strategy and for extended 
out-of-area engagements. These frustrating limitations in Iraq have prevented NATO 
from engaging the full range of their capabilities and experience, and have hindered the 
more dynamic options of U.S. and SHAPE planners.  Hopefully, the Iraq training mission 
will represent a beginning to, and not the extent of, NATO involvement in Iraq. 
1. NATO’s Afghanistan Mission Continues to Expand  
After NATO assumed command of ISAF in 2004, the next milestone in the war 
ravaged country would be the presidential elections scheduled in the fall.  To prepare for 
this historic event, NATO increased their troop presence in and around Kabul to 10,000 
with the reinforcements including a deployment of 1,000 troops from the NRF prior to 
the September 2004 elections.195  NATO also supported further stabilization efforts by 
establishing additional Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), organizations of 
international civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan’s provinces to 
extend the authority of the central government and facilitate development and 
reconstruction.196 NATO also assumed control of those PRT’s in their area of 
responsibility that were being operated by different countries and non-governmental 
organizations.  The assumption of responsibility of these PRT’s will facilitate greater 
security for and efficiency in stabilization efforts in the countryside, as well as coordinate 
and focus further relief efforts outside of Kabul.  The Alliance is also in the process of 
expanding ISAF further to the West, taking over responsibility of territory as well as 
those existing PRTs being operated under the separate U.S.-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF).  
2. “NATO in Palestine?”  
The Middle East and the Transatlantic Alliance are becoming increasingly 
interdependent, as no other region’s development will affect transatlantic security 
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more.197 When NATO was being debated as a possible lead role in the stabilization of 
Iraq, further informal discussions have led to a theoretical involvement in (and around) 
Palestine.198  While no official requests for additional planning for such an event has 
been tasked to SHAPE, any possible NATO assistance and contribution to the settlement 
of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict would certainly be a controversial issue.   
NATO has been informally discussed serving in a Stabilization mission as part of 
the establishment of peace between Israel and Palestine as a measure of the enhanced 
Mediterranean Dialogue, in attempts towards improving relationships between NATO 
and its Middle Eastern Partners, and for the potential security benefits of a third party 
peacekeeping intervention in the region.199  While NATO has stated it’s willingness to 
serve in this capacity if tasked, the deployment of a NATO force would require the 
following preconditions that have been determined by the Alliance to be in place before 
such a deployment is authorized: a lasting peace agreement between Israel and Palestine, 
an agreement by both parties to the intervention and the declaration a UN Mandate.200   
Although these conditions do not yet exist, a multilateral agreement to a permissive 
intervention under these conditions could herald the next substantial out-of-area mission 
for NATO in its forward defense strategy.   
3. NATO’s Response Force becomes Operational  
After its adoption at the Prague Summit, the NRF was heralded as the centerpiece 
of the new NATO plan for defense transformation.201  The NRF is a brigade-sized, 
combined arms expeditionary force large enough to make a contribution in modern, high-
tech military operations alongside the U.S., but small and agile enough to be deployed 
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swiftly, especially when configured in smaller, battalion-sized detachments.  The NRF 
will provide NATO with the immediate capability it requires to influence the processes of 
defense, security and stability in out-of-area crisis response and conflict prevention.  The 
NRF achieved an initial operational capability in October 2004, and by January 2005 
contained 18,000 troops, with a full capability of 21,000 expected by summer 2006.202 
Small contingents of the NRF were quietly deployed for securing the European Football 
Championships in Portugal in July, the Summer Olympic Games in Greece during 
August, and in September to provide security during the Afghanistan presidential 
elections.203  To date, the NRF concept has been demonstrated as successful, and is a 
continuing impetus for NATO’s military forces to persist in military transformation 
efforts.  
4. NATO’s Training Mission in Iraq (2004 – 2005) 
The scope of NATO’s involvement in Iraq would remain indirect until Iraqi 
interim Prime Minister; Ilyad Allawi requested NATO support through training and other 
forms of technical assistance on 22 June 2004.204 After sending a fact-finding team to 
Baghdad, the North Atlantic Council agreed at NATO’s Istanbul Summit to establish a 
NATO Training and Implementation Mission in Iraq.205  A detailed agreement followed 
on 8 October 2004, and NATO trainers and instructors deployed soon afterwards.206   
NATO’s mission in Iraq would not be combat, but instead would focus on 
training, assisting with equipping, and providing technical assistance for Iraqi Security 
Forces, Joint Headquarters personnel, and help to build nation-wide, multi-ethnic security 
institutions.  While working closely with the Multinational Force, the Alliance mission 
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would be under close and continuous NATO political guidance.  To further reinforce the 
training vs. combat role of the mission, the commander of the Multinational Training 
Effort would be dual-hatted as the commander of the NATO Training Effort, reporting up 
the NATO chain of command to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in this 
capacity instead of the commander of the Multinational Force.207   
By December, the mission would be expanded to include up to 300 personnel 
deployed in Iraq, including trainers and support staff, and with a significant increase in 
the existing training and mentoring being provided to mid-and senior level personnel 
from the Iraqi security forces.  This expansion would be followed by an additional stage 
establishing the Training, Education and Doctrine Center near Baghdad in 2005.208  
According to U.S. General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
(SACEUR), the NATO mission to Iraq could eventually involve upwards of 3000 
troops.209   
D. THE EUROPEAN UNION: A LEGITIMATE SECURITY ACTOR 
The EU has provided substantial financial support for the election process in 
Afghanistan, providing approximately $80 million by December 2004, about half of the 
total international contributions to the election process to date.210  Military contributions 
in Afghanistan by the EU involved 23 member nations by May 2005, and accounted for 
two-thirds of ISAF’s total deployment.211   Turkey currently commands ISAF with Italy 
scheduled to assume this role August 2005. By May 2005, EU member nations were 
commanding five PRT’s in the north and north-east of the country, are scheduled to 
establish two new PRT’s and take over one existing U.S.-led PRT as part of ISAF’s  
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Summer 2005 expansion to the West of Afghanistan.  Several member nations 
were also contributing directly to the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan; Operation 
Enduring Freedom. 
1. EU Stability Operations 
The five-nation Eurocorps (France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg) 
directly commands the 5000-man Franco-German Brigade and the Multinational 
Command Support Brigade.212  The Eurocorps provided the core of ISAF headquarters in 
Kabul from August 2004 to February 2005, and assumed command of EUFOR, through 
which military coalition the EU took over stability operations in Bosnia from NATO’s 
SFOR.213  Deployment of EU forces to missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Macedonia and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) resulted in the deployment of approximately 
55,000 EU troops between 2003 and 2004.214  The EU also remains involved in the 
Middle East Peace Process as well, maintaining a political engagement through the 
auspices of the Barcelona Process, established by the EU in 1995.   
2. Battle Groups 
In June 2004, the proposed concept of European “Battle Groups” was accepted by 
the European Union as a capability with which the EU can further contribute to conflict 
prevention, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in close co-operation with 
the United Nations.215  The Battle Group is configured around a reinforced battalion of 
combat troops that in all totals 1,500 highly trained, expeditionary soldiers.  The Battle 
Groups soldiers are supported by combined arms, combat support, service support, air 
and naval support, as well as the necessary deployment and sustainment capabilities, 
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required for thirty days of independent expeditionary operations.216  These units will be 
maintained in a high state of readiness, being prepared to deploy within fifteen days of 
notification.   They are intended to be flexible enough to promptly undertake operations 
in distant crisis areas, under, but not exclusively, a U.N. mandate, and to conduct combat 
missions in potentially extreme environments such as deserts, jungles and mountains.  
Besides serving in an independent capacity, they can prepare the ground for follow-on 
deployments of larger combat forces or peacekeeping missions.  The peacekeeping 
mission to the DRC (commanded by the Eurocorps) established a standard for future EU 
Battle Group employments.   
The European Battle Group represents a modular concept towards developing 
European rapid reaction capabilities.   A Battle Group is built around a battalion-sized 
unit and represents the smallest self-sufficient military operational unit that can be 
effectively deployed and sustained independently in a theater of operations.  The concept 
is similar to the United States Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), an 
infantry battalion reinforced with supporting arms, combat and service support, as well as 
dedicated air and sea transport and supporting fires.217  The MEU is a 2,000-troop unit 
that is routinely embarked aboard amphibious shipping and forward deployed to potential 
crisis areas in six-month duty rotations on station. 218  
Adopting this concept makes increased interoperability and cooperation among 
the EU forces with forward deployed United States units more efficient due to the similar 
composition and mission.  Also, the availability of pooled assets within the EU to create a 
small, manageable-sized and expeditionary focused Battle Groups make this a capability 
that is not only relevant and applicable in a forward defense strategy, but is also 
attainable in many aspects within existing military resources, especially those of the more 
modern forces of the Eurocorps. 
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The EU insists that the Battle Group concept and the NATO Rapid Reaction 
Force are complementary and mutually reinforcing.219  NATO also emphasizes that EU 
defense and security matters must continue to take place complementary with NATO and 
without duplication.220 Despite differences in the past, and potential conflicts of interest 
in the future, the Alliance would recognize at the Istanbul Summit that the EU had made 
considerable progress in the transformation of is military forces and their capabilities.  
NATO was now recognizing the role of the European Union in Europe’s forward defense 
strategy, and the EU has been recognized as a legitimate security actor by the Alliance.221 
E. ANALYSIS: THE INEVITABILITY OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RIFT 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AS AN OUT-OF-AREA 
SECURITY ACTOR  
Unfortunately, the rift in the Alliance was inevitable as the faults that precipitated 
it were inherent in the institution.  As the mission of NATO evolved, and its capabilities 
were transformed, a new role emerged as the Alliance structure transformed to adapt to 
its out-of-area requirements.  Once the transatlantic rift occurred, NATO was able to 
recognize inherent flaws and shortfalls in the structure of the Alliance, and to eventually 
move beyond these imperfections.  NATO also had to experience these core difficulties 
in order to demonstrate the importance of adopting the PCC and in achieving a united 
strategy among the Allies on the mechanisms for out-of-area interventions in its 
continued transformation upon adopting an expeditionary, out-of-area, forward defense 
strategic concept. What would emerge from the discord would be a stronger, more 
focused Alliance who’s increased capabilities would demonstrate an improved potential 
for future out-of-area operations. 
Through its history the greatest threat to the Alliance has not been a unifying 
external threat, but the internal dissentions and self-interests of its member nations.  
NATO could survive the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, but can it survive itself and 
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the members that compose it?  There are still flaws remaining in the structures composing 
the Alliance that threaten the relevance of the institution and its operational functions in 
the execution of the expeditionary military engagements necessary for forward defense.  
These limitations will impact future deployments, but in the aftermath of the transatlantic 
rift, the on-going military operations, and the ever-present threat of transnational 
terrorism encourage an atmosphere of cooperation.  If the Allies chose to continue this 
reconciliation, NATO has the potential to serve a premier role in international security 
and in a forward defense of Europe, if properly utilized.  These issues will be discussed in 
the sections that follow.  
1. NATO will Function Despite Its Inherent Flaws 
Both the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions had illuminated inherent shortfalls in 
the structures that utilize the NATO Alliance as an expeditionary security actor.  
Afghanistan had demonstrated that, while the political consensus of NATO could grant 
international legitimacy to non-permissive interventions (and invasions), the majority of 
the Alliance did not possess capabilities as a whole that would merit utilizing the 
cumbersome structure as an operational command organization.  Contributions by 
Alliance members in the post-stability phase were welcome, but this role limits the armed 
forces of these countries towards low-tech functions such as security forces, police duties 
and rebuilding infrastructures.  While these duties are a critical part of long-term 
preventive engagements, this focus would not encourage European countries to continue 
modernization efforts of their Cold War structured military forces if they were only going 
to be used as low-tech instructors, policemen and public works facilitators.  Unless there 
was serious impetus to interoperate with modern (U.S.) forces in true war-fighting 
capabilities, Europe would not attempt, or continue, efforts to increase national defense 
budgets towards transformation efforts.  The results of this lack of investment in defense 
would be that commitments of the NATO Prague Summit and the Prague Capabilities 
Commitments would be stymied from lack of funds, the gap in the military capabilities 
within the Alliance would only continue to worsen, and Europe could not shoulder a 
higher portion of its security requirements.  Therefore, the United States would be 
frustrated in attempts to incorporate European capabilities into expeditionary operations, 
further encouraging unilateral foreign policy decisions.    
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Iraq, on the other hand, had demonstrated that a lack of political consensus within 
the international community and a multinational alliance could have serious effects upon 
out-of-area operations, especially in maintaining and sustaining a prolonged stabilization 
and reconstruction mission in the aftermath of an unsanctioned intervention.  While the 
lack of a legitimizing mandate from an international security institution cannot prevent 
independent action by a member that had sufficient capabilities to do so, unilateral action 
could result in the lack of burden sharing guarantees from Allies that would facilitate an 
effective exit strategy for the intervention. Thus, withholding international support to 
stabilization efforts threatens out-of-area interventions with turning into quagmires as 
ethnic factions and local actors frequently emerge and struggle for dominance and self- 
interests in the post-conflict instability.  In short, there is no effective, or quick, exit 
strategy. 
These interventions illustrated the interrelated shortfalls in both the capabilities 
and bureaucratic decision-making structures of the Alliance in regards to the conflicting 
methods espoused in the Security Strategies of both the United States and Europe, and 
especially in the application and execution of the out-of-area interventions.  Europe is stll 
challenged in their ability to initially and rapidly project sufficient combat capability in 
order to influence foreign policy or execute a large-scale crisis response mission.  This 
lack of capability requires that they have access to the full potential and existing 
capabilities within the Alliance to execute an expeditionary intervention.  Therefore, 
Europe is dependent upon the consensus of coalitions, alliances and other burden-sharing, 
collective security arrangements in order to provide, deploy and employ sufficient 
military forces and capabilities for out-of-area operations.  What encumbers this method 
of asset and command sharing arrangement is the impediments and constraints of a 
consensual, multilateral decision-making structure that does not facilitate rapid decision-
making or effectively function with dissention among contributors.  
But once the cumbersome process is complete, the European process is effective 
towards sustaining a prolonged effort. The Alliance’s efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, and Afghanistan are examples of substantial multilateral stabilization efforts 
that were implemented after successful, albeit dysfunctional, military campaigns.  
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Though the Alliance experienced frustrating delays, inefficiencies, impediments and 
disruptions in the conduct of combat operations, NATO has demonstrated a European 
penchant for perseverance in extended out-of-area peace operations. 
The U.S. National Security Strategy advocates an independence from, and an 
ideological avoidance to, the encumbering requirements of collective expeditionary 
security, if these institutions do not promote a method of strong reassurance for the 
security and protection to which America has grown accustomed.  Though the United 
States had the ability to hand select particular Allies to participate in the combat phase of 
the Afghanistan invasion, and thus bypass an existing consensus for the freedom of 
unfettered operations, it was due to burden shifting of post-conflict stability 
responsibilities to NATO that allowed the U.S. military to shift their military planning 
and force projection capabilities towards Iraq.  But in choosing the unilateralist choice in 
Iraq, the U.S. has expended this option.  The scope and complexity of the Iraq occupation 
has effectively made this decision a one-shot alternative.   
Without the capacity to shift stabilization efforts, or to recruit a more substantial 
multinational force, due to poorly managed pre-conflict policies and diplomacy, the U.S. 
will not be able to extricate their military forces from Iraq until security has been 
established, a post-regime Iraqi government is functioning, and that government and its 
security forces are prepared to continue internal security responsibilities.  Such an 
ambitious, ill-defined and complex goal is guaranteed to keep a significant number of 
U.S. forces involved in occupation duties for several years to come.  This daunting 
requirement, in addition to ongoing U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, affects the 
ability of the U.S. to significantly involve their forces elsewhere in the world.  Unilateral 
foreign options will certainly be limited for the rest of President Bush’s administration.  
2. The EU will Compete with, but not Replace NATO 
While the leaders of Europe and the United States acknowledge the importance of 
transatlantic cooperation, there will be competition for military capabilities within the 
Alliance, as well as in research and development of defense systems and platforms, with 
the prospect of potential markets in national and foreign military defense.   This 
competition will present a growing issue within the transatlantic relationship as Europe 
proceeds in the transformation of their military forces, achieves more modern 
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capabilities, and establishes a collective defense industry.   A current dilemma within the 
Transatlantic Alliance is how to encourage growth and modernization in Europe’s 
strategic focus and military capabilities while ensuring availability of crisis response 
assets, protecting existing and potential national and foreign defense markets, and 
ensuring the security interests of NATO. 
Though some advocates see the emergence of an efficient ESPD as a herald to 
NATO’s demise, both Europe and the United States acknowledge that NATO is the 
lynchpin in the transatlantic, hence European, defense strategy.  Javier Solana’s comment 
that the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable was incorporated into the European 
Security Strategy.222  President Bush would also acknowledge the importance of NATO 
by stating that, “NATO is the “cornerstone” of the transatlantic relationship, and that 
because of NATO, Europe is “whole, united and at peace.”223  Those in Europe who 
believe that they must weaken NATO to strengthen ESDP are only likely to achieve an 
insecure and incapable Europe unsure of itself and its role in the world.  If they want 
Washington to support ESDP, they must produce real capabilities and assume real 
peacekeeping responsibilities, for instance in Bosnia.  Those in the United States who 
believe that strengthening ESDP means weakening NATO are only likely to achieve a 
lonely superpower unable to count on the added capabilities and resources of its allies 
when it comes to facing new threats and risks (and responsibilities/commitments).224 
While European Forces are well experienced in prolonged post-war occupations, 
stabilization and reconstruction missions, this does not exclude the necessity of being 
well prepared for the complexities of modern joint/multinational combat operations. For 
Europe to focus only on peacekeeping is an unhealthy division of labor.  European forces 
can be made fully capable of modern-era combat if they acquire the new assets and 
                                                 
222 European Security Strategy, pg. 15. 
223 Lord Robertson meets Greek EU presidency, NATO Update, NATO, Brussels, 16 January 2003, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/01-january/e0116a.htm accessed 17 May 2005. 
224 What is Transformation and What Does It Mean for NATO?, in Transatlantic Transformations, pg. 
21. 
 93
doctrines in achievable increments.225 As with similar U.S. military doctrine, European 
forces must be capable of both winning wars and maintaining the peace afterwards. 
The enabling mission for NATO will continue to be out-of-area, forward security 
strategy, with the main instrument of this strategy being the NRF.  The Alliance sees the 
NRF and the EU’s Headline Goal Force, the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) as fully 
compatible and mutually reinforcing initiatives.226  The European Security Strategy also 
makes clear that European defense plans that are compatible with the common security 
and defense policy established within NATO, such as the Berlin Plus arrangements, 
enhance the operational capability of the EU.227  Though at times the role of the NRF and 
the EU’s RRF will appear similar and duplicative, a competition between these two 
forces is unlikely due to a different focus towards missions, as well as in the provisions of 
the European Security Strategy and NATO’s Strategic Concept.   
NRF’s primary focus will be rapid deployments and high-intensity combat in both 
Article 5 collective defense or non-Article 5 crisis response interventions and 
stabilization missions.228  RRF will be tasked primarily to fulfill the requirements of 
long-term preventive engagement and post-conflict peacekeeping duties under the 
auspices of the Petersberg Tasks.  The RRF represents a European option, a regional 
alternative to the Transatlantic Alliance, and not a duplicate mutual defense institution.  
Also, it is a European commitment to shoulder a larger share of the security burden that 
was previously provided by the United States.  Finally, the RRF’s focus will generally be 
towards Europe’s immediate periphery and its unstable Eastern additions.  The distance 
that the EU projected their forces in the case of the Congo, while impressive, will be the 
exception at present, and future interventions are more likely be short in duration and/or 
small in scale until more capabilities are established for such missions. 
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Arguments can be made that both structures have the capacity to perform the 
same mission.  While this is true, currently only NATO has established organizational 
and command infrastructures with sufficient experience in large scale, out-of-area 
missions.  Though the establishment of a European military headquarters in Brussels 
provides this capacity to the EU, in reality its structure was reduced from that originally 
envisioned by France and Germany due to resistance from Britain that the organization 
was an attempt to duplicate NATO planning capabilities.  By compromising on the size 
of the European military headquarters, the EU has committed to complementing NATO 
capabilities, not replacing them.  Therefore, with the limited size of the headquarters, 
only small-scale missions, such as Operation Artemis, will likely be planned and 
executed without recourse to NATO planning assets.  With NATO assets available under 
the Berlin-plus agreements for larger deployments, such an arrangement further 
encourages cooperation and available options among the operational forces of both 
NATO and the EU.   
There will be instances of dual tasking of forces that are assigned to both the NRF 
and the ERF, despite guidance to avoid this situation.  Also, there will be instances of 
deliberate secrecy and compartmentalization of planning and executing particular 
missions due to operational security requirements or regional self-interests.  In extreme 
cases there may be examples of mission poaching as one organization is awarded the 
mandate by the U.N. Security Council to execute a particular mission at the elimination 
of the other.  But in general, the multilateral decision making processes of both the EU 
and NATO will manage these issues and prevent serious political and service discord 
over expeditionary operations.  Also, the interrelation of EU military structures 
incorporated into NATO, such as the Eurocorps and Battle Groups, guarantee a notable 
EU contribution to NATO deployments.  In general, competition within the Alliance will 
not be at the operational level.  
Rather, competition will exist at the strategic level, as Europe attains the capacity 
to field and maintain a modern, transformed military, and further implement a European 
strategic focus.  In June 2004, EU leaders agreed to establish a European Defense Agency 
(EDA) devoted to improving European military capabilities and interoperability.  A key 
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focus of EDA will be to help the EU’s 25 member states to stretch their scarce defense 
funds farther by increasing cooperation among members in areas of weapons research, 
development and procurement.229  The development of a European defense industry has 
important implications for the future of transatlantic defense cooperation.  While there is 
skepticism among U.S. defense experts as to the efficiency of European defense industry 
cooperation, European defense firms have been increasing cooperation with each other 
rather than the United States.230   
The development of a European defense industry will increase the competition 
with Europe in the global arms market.  America’s globally dominant defense industry 
provides a strong rational for European collaboration to compete internationally and to 
avoid dependence on the United States.  That competition may also increase the 
likelihood that Europe firms will sell their advanced capabilities to countries in which the 
United States and Europe have different strategic interests, such as China.231  
ESDP will not make NATO redundant, as the EU has chosen, at present, to serve 
in a follow-on capacity to NATO deployments while developing expertise in 
expeditionary operations.  Operation Artemis notwithstanding, until the EU acquires 
sufficient experience in out-of-area operations, Europe will not execute deployments 
equal in scope to large NATO operations, at least for some time.  NATO will remain the 
preferred instrument to implement a forward defense strategy, especially when U.S. 
assistance is required and in the absence of a more robust European expeditionary 
capability.  Accepting on-going missions, such as in Bosnia and Macedonia, will be the 
norm for EU out-of-area operations.  Independent interventions, as in the Congo, will be 
the exception, but will provide an opportunity for the EU to develop and maintain an 
expertise in expeditionary operations, showcase increasing military capabilities, and to 
demonstrate a legitimate role as a global security actor.  
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Though approximately 55,000 EU military forces deployed between 2003 and 
2004, these deployments exhausted the EU’s limited independent capabilities.  Despite 
having approximately 1.4 million regular troops and 1 million reserves, the nations of the 
EU were complaining of being over-stretched.232  This demonstrates that the European 
Union still has a long way to go towards improving their expeditionary capability and 
transforming their Cold War structured military forces.  Therefore, the EU will not be 
directly competing with NATO for some time.   
Ideally, an increased expeditionary capability and focus in the EU under the ESS 
will complement NATO’s out of area strategy.  Modern, interoperable, capable and 
expeditionary European forces can provide a venue for increased military cooperation 
within Europe through deployments, bilateral training and exercises.   This example will 
also encourage and promote further development transformation and modernization of 
European military forces and their capabilities.  As always, European forces will continue 
to be requested to serve in their historic capacity of experienced and professional 
peacekeepers, providing relief, or an additional capability, for long term NATO 
stabilization operations.  Finally, European forces, as an independent capability with a 
European identity, can provide an operational and/or strategic alternative to a NATO 
deployment in politically sensitive regions, or when the interests of the Alliance as a 
whole are not engaged. 
Though the Battle Group concept is sustainable by the limited capabilities of the 
member nations of the EU, they will have difficulties maintaining the expectations of 
between 6 to 10 operational units.  Due to the level of readiness and interoperability 
required to function in this assignment, the EU will have to further increase 
transformation efforts within of their military forces in order to sustain this level of 
readiness.  Also, the high degree of interoperability required of capabilities and units will 
naturally eliminate those countries that have not accomplished significant transformation 
of their military forces to date.  Thus the burden will fall upon countries such as Great 
Britain, France and Germany to provide the support to maintain the capability.  Also, 
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though a uniform training and predeployment standard may be established, there will be 
varying degrees of competence and capability between the units of member nations that 
contribute to the Battle Groups.  This variable makes attaining a consistent standard of 
readiness and capability for the Battle Group a challenging issue.   
3. Unilateralism has Run Its Course, at Least in the Current U.S. 
Administration (2005) 
Multilateral Cooperation now appears to be the preferred method, at present, for 
further controlling the proliferation of WMD.  NATO, the EU and the U.S. are addressing 
the International Community’s grave concerns on Iran’s nuclear activities and is talking 
with this country on ways to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its 
program.233  Furthermore, the U.S. has been insistent upon a diplomatic format of a 
multiparty, six-nation framework of talks with North Korea, despite consistent demands 
from Pyongyang that the negotiations be bilateral.234  
The occupation of Iraq has exhausted U.S. capabilities.  The US also has to 
maintain sufficient deployable military forces to respond in a crisis or they are vulnerable 
to coercion by the same “rogue” nations that they sought to intimidate with the 
interventionist foreign policy in Iraq.  The posturing and rhetoric by Iran and North 
Korea, the other pillars of the Administration’s stated ideological “axis of evil”, is 
certainly a result of their assessments the impact of the Iraq occupation on the 
expeditionary and readiness capabilities of U.S. forces.235   
In the subsequent event of a legitimate crisis, the US should not have difficulties 
achieving a mandate necessary for multilateral support. But there is no room left for more 
unilateral interventions in U.S. security strategy.  In order to employ a response capability 
to a significant external security threat, the U.S. will require considerable operational 
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relief in Iraq, the contributions of interoperable coalition partners, or a united multilateral 
effort to mass the capabilities necessary to undertake such an endeavor.   
The Bush administration appears to have acknowledged the requirement for 
collective security soon after the replacement of Secretary of State Colin Powell, noted 
for his dissention to unilateralism, by Condoleeza Rice, an enthusiastic and loyal 
supporter of the Bush administration’s interventionist foreign policy. Though Powell’s 
resignation appeared to be a portent of further brusque U.S. diplomacy and foreign 
policy, soon after her appointment Rice began a trip of reconciliation through Europe.  
The installation of Rice consolidates the ideological victory of the National Security 
Strategy without the entrenchment of continued a continued unilateralist foreign policy.  
The Bush administration will likely practice a conciliatory foreign policy with their 
European Allies now that they can do so from a position of strength and conviction. After 
the declaration of victory of the unilateralist ideology, the Administration appears to be 
working towards a more multilateral approach and is putting the unpleasant past of the 
Iraq discord behind them.236 
A trend of reconciliation was evident during the European visits of US Secretary 
of State Condoleeza Rice and President George W. Bush in February 2005. A year 
earlier, calls from the Bush administration for a transatlantic crusade to advance the 
causes of freedom and democracy might have been greeted with open derision in 
European capitals.237 This time, the reception was warmer than it has been at any time 
since the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Clearly, the carefully choreographed atmospherics 
of a set-piece presidential visit must be treated with a healthy dose of skepticism. There 
are encouraging signs, however, that both the Bush administration and its European 
critics have suspended their more polarizing tendencies, seeking instead to emphasize the 
common ground between their respective transformational visions.   
The administration has begun jettisoning remaining unilateral neo-conservatives 
to multilateral institutions, where their ability to function in these environments is 
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certainly controversial. The architect of the Iraq invasion, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Wolfowitz, has been accepted as head of the World Bank, following a path similar to 
Secretary of Defense and Vietnam war proponent Robert McNamara before him.238  
Undersecretary of State for arms control and international security John Bolton, a strong 
conservative frequently at odds with his former boss Colin Powell, but supported by other 
neo-conservatives in the administration as a loyal Bush supporter, seems destined to be 
the U.S. ambassadorship to the United Nations, despite his unilateralist convictions and 
abrasive, confrontational demeanor.239  Donald Rumsfeld will be primarily occupied with 
the continuing complexities of the Iraq occupation, OEF, the War on Terror, 
repositioning U.S. forces from Europe to stateside, as well as the latest round of base 
realignment and closure issues.  These concerns, in additional to necessary operational 
and multilateral planning for highly unlikely putative military operations against Iran and 
North Korea for violations of nuclear weapons proliferation agreements, should keep the 
defense department occupied for the rest of Rumsfeld’s tenure.   
4. Institutional, Cultural and Ideological Differences Remain in the 
Alliance and will Impact NATO’s Operations 
Differences in the interpretations of security threats, the necessity for out-of-area 
involvements and national caveats will continue to impede NATO deployments.  
Furthermore, these differences will effect the assumption of stability operations, 
especially those resulting from non-NATO interventions.  In order to act or implement 
change in a European multilateral institution, time is required to achieve the consensus 
and diplomacy necessary within the institutions where multinational decisions are made.  
For the US to expect immediate compliance with an interventionist foreign policy in Iraq 
with limited debate, lack of a clear U.N. mandate or exhausting diplomatic measures 
signaled a profound misunderstanding of, or callus disregard for, European culture and 
the role this distinct identity has upon decision-making structures. Providing the United 
States with the means to execute a subsequent unilateral intervention would be one of the 
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reasons that France and Germany are hesitant to provide NATO leadership and troop 
commitments in the Iraq stabilization effort.  Therefore, these two Alliance members can 
exercise considerable influence within NATO’s decision-making structure and effectively 
balance against U.S. foreign policy by adopting a position of limited cooperation and 
national caveats in NATO.   The frustration with the disparity of influence that members 
can exude is an inherent weakness of such a multilateral structure based upon achieving 
the consensus of its members.  This weakness was a chief reason that the U.S. chose to 
pursue a unilateral security strategy in the aftermath of 9/11, the invocation of Article 5 
notwithstanding.    
France’s insistence that Iraq remain a training mission vs. a combat mission 
prevents NATO from assuming operational control of the Multinational Force.  Germany 
is also convinced that the Alliance may not be the best instrument to establish security 
and stability in Iraq.240  The cumbersome command arrangement also serves to separate 
the Alliance effort from the U.S.- led coalition, preventing a more direct role in the 
stabilization mission and blocking the deployments of a more robust presence of NATO 
peacekeepers, whose expertise could be well utilized in the troubled region. 
Resistance to combining ISAF and OEF has been an additional Franco/German 
issue within the Alliance.  There has been criticism of NATO foot-dragging in 
Afghanistan.  While extra troops were promised in July to help with election security, the 
Afghan interim President Karzia asked NATO leaders at the Istanbul Summit that they be 
deployed immediately.241 There was also concern that the troops were to be deployed in 
the largely peaceful North, rather than the more volatile South and East, where scores of 
election officials and would be voters had been killed. Extra troops promised by NATO 
leaders have not materialized -- excluding Germany and Canada, ISAF's other 33 
contributing nations have mustered only 3,000 troops among them.242 And essential 
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hardware, such as helicopters and C-130 heavy transport planes, remained in hangars 
because European finance ministries refused to pay for them to be transported to 
Afghanistan.243   
Attempts to further expand the NATO mission have not been successful. While 
the U.S. prefers a unified command structure in Afghanistan, attempts to merge both 
ISAF and OEF under NATO control are being blocked by both France and Germany.  
Both of these Alliance members prefer that there be a distinction between combat and 
stability forces due to parliamentary restrictions, recruiting concerns, and training 
requirements.244  There is also concern among the Allies that the U.S. would redirect 
troops scheduled for Afghanistan to more pressing needs in Iraq should NATO assume 
control of ISAF.  NATO has the capacity to do more, but is once again is politically 
blocked by the national interests of a few of its 26 members.  
Currently in the NATO operations, SACEUR, General James Jones, USMC, has 
been increasingly critical of “national caveats” that have troubled operations in the 
Balkans.245  In principle, NATO governments have committed forces to allied missions, 
and therefore are not technically under national control. 246  But national governments 
have put increasing restrictions on those tasks that their forces may undertake, and have 
gone as far as to instruct their officers not to carry out particular NATO operations such 
as in crowd control operations by KFOR in Kosovo.  In the face of rioting conducted by 
Albanians against Serbs, German forces refused to participate in crowd control operations 
with other KFOR members.247 General Jones sites these cases as highly disruptive of 
Allied operations, and demonstrates that NATO operations in the Balkans still suffer 
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from the lack of unity of command and purpose.248  In the midst of crisis management, 
operational consensus is difficult to maintain and impossible to achieve. 
5. For NATO to Assume a Leading Role as an Expeditionary Security 
Actor, It must be able to Conduct Rapid Response 
Since its Kosovo intervention, NATO has not been engaged in the lead capacity 
for a crisis response intervention.  The next major crisis to face the Alliance may require 
a more rapid and direct response than NATO has executed in the past.  Either because of 
a catastrophic act of terrorism resulting in mass-casualties, or as a result of dramatic 
human rights violations, security threats from rogue nations or failing due to WMD 
proliferation, or due to a humanitarian crisis or a natural disaster, NATO may have to 
intervene more rapidly than has been their history.  This test will not come announced or 
expected, and is not looming, but it is always an unfortunate possibility, and one for 
which the Alliance must be prepared. 
Now that the NRF is operational, NATO is equipped with the capability to 
effectively execute out-of-area rapid response missions and to effectively serve as an 
operational security actor in crisis management.  This capability, combined with the PCC 
decisions of a streamlined decision-making command structure and national 
commitments towards military transformation, has provided NATO with a formidable 
means of implementing a multilateral forward security strategy. 
Utilizing the NRF in a rapid response capacity will serve to further validate the 
expeditionary focus of the Alliance, and their role as an Out-of-Area security actor with 
the capability to conduct the full range of missions from humanitarian assistance to 
combat operations.  But to validate this capability, NATO will have to intervene quickly 
enough in a crisis to have a significant and/or beneficial impact.  The key factors in 
NATO’s success in this capacity, and in a leading vs. supporting role, will be speed and 
cooperation.   
The next crisis will likely follow multilateral procedures in a concerted effort by 
the Allies to utilize and validate the Alliance and demonstrate transatlantic cooperation 
and unity.  In theory the mechanisms exist to execute a rapid response.  Unfortunately, 
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NATO’s past interventions have proven that the Alliance suffers from unity of effort due 
to national caveats, or is hindered in their consensus by the actions of a few obstinate 
members and their self-interests.  With the inherent flaws extant within the structures of 
the Alliance, consensus may be difficult to achieve under the duress of a crisis.  In the 
end, the Allies will have to do more than “agree to disagree”, but will have to rapidly 
arrive at a consensus decision in order to deploy the NRF in sufficient time to have an 
operational and strategic impact in the crisis. 
A strategy that is implemented primarily using mission-based coalitions or 
dependent upon unilateral freedom of action will not have the ability to sustain an 
intervention that established security institutions could provide.  Also, a unilateral, self-
interested course of action is destabilizing and polarizing upon an international 
community of strategic interdependent security requirements, global economies, and 
common values.   Both the United States and Europe will benefit should the Alliance be 
consistently engaged as the preferred instrument in implementing a forward defense 
strategy. 
F. CONCLUSION   
Through its history the greatest threat to the Alliance has been internal; adapting 
to changes in the security environment, discord within its membership and in the 
conflicting cultures and self-interests of Europe and North America has caused the 
greatest disruptions of NATO’s organization and its utilization as a security actor.  After 
each time of crisis, NATO has recovered, adapted and emerged stronger, albeit still 
imperfect.  NATO has done so once again and can continue as the premier instrument 
with which to engage the United States in European security and to execute an 
expeditionary defense strategy that engages the formidable resources of both regions that 
constitute the Transatlantic Alliance. 
NATO’s success in out-of-area missions will be measured, not through success or 
failure, but through continued involvement. Grand Catastrophes such as terrorist attacks, 
the proliferation of WMD, Tsunamis & continuing humanitarian crises will offer ample 
opportunities for out-of-area engagements for the Alliance.  NATO has the potential to 
thrive in a forward security role, especially since the adoption of the NRF and the 
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conciliatory and cooperative environment towards negotiations since the Iraq crisis.  The 
Alliance should continue to be the central point in transatlantic security, as it has in the 
past, because of its place as the only transatlantic organization based on the defense of its 
members. 249  As the only international institution in Europe of which the United States 
was a recognized leader, NATO can continue to be the institution through which the 
United States can best pursue its interests in Europe.  A NATO that can project power 
and purpose outside of Europe will greatly enhance the odds of preserving world peace 
while advancing democratic values that the organization espouses.250   
Finally, the simple reality is that the United States cannot handle the global 
problems of the contemporary era alone, and neither can Europe.  Together, however, 
they can succeed.  This is the main reason for keeping the Alliance together and engaging 
it in a forward defense strategy. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
While the United States did not need allies or the sanction by the UN to invade 
Iraq, it has subsequently learned that that problems of a postwar reconstruction effort are 
too great for any one country, however powerful, to handle.  The U.S. needs money and 
peacekeepers from other countries to help with the endeavor, and it needs a mandate from 
a major international security institution to bestow legitimacy upon expeditionary 
interventions in order to guarantee multinational contributions of scale.  To sustain 
expeditionary operations of scale and substance, such as in Iraq, requires a multilateral 
effort.  
The U.S. needs the fledgling interoperable and expeditionary military capabilities 
of Europe, as well as the multinational legitimacy, in order to sustain adequate 
contributions of troops, materials and public opinion necessary to achieve stability and to 
execute a successful exit strategy that maintains international credibility.  Due to the 
significant costs and impact upon America’s operational military forces in Iraq, the Bush 
administration is apt to adopt a more multilateral position in future military interventions, 
at least in the near future. 
Europe has learned that it cannot counter or halt U.S. intentions due to the lack of 
a unified opposition amongst the EU, or a U.S. dependency upon European military 
hardware.  If the EU desires to have influence in forming and executing U.S. foreign 
policy, it will require a united consensus towards providing or withholding subsequent 
contributions of troops for extended support and stability operations.  The aftermath in 
Iraq shows how costly unilateral peacekeeping can be: it has sapped U.S. military 
capability and undermined public support for international policies.  The U.S. did not 
want or need high intensity assistance, but they did, and still do, desire peacekeepers. 
The potential rewards for nations that provide political and post-conflict support 
for future “coalitions of the willing” can be very appealing for poorer countries, such as 
those in Eastern European.  The benefits of supporting a combined EU opposition bloc 
would have to outweigh the rewards for joining an ad hoc coalition on a specific foreign  
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policy intervention in the future.  Therefore, in order to execute the tenets of the ESS, the 
EU must achieve the consensus necessary to prevent future defections from a multilateral 
security policy, such as ESDP. 
Also, the EU must continue to create and maintain the means to support 
expeditionary interventions as a security actor.  Europe must provide more than 
peacekeeping troops for operational relief of forces in theater.  While it is not necessary, 
or possible, for the EU to replicate the full range of capabilities that provide the U.S. its 
advantage and dominance, European military forces must be able to work in adjacent and 
supporting roles with U.S. and major coalition operations.  This will require the ability to 
interoperate, as well as coordinate and communicate on a level with the latest military 
technology.  Also, sufficient monetary investment will be necessary in order to sustain 
and implement those measures agreed to in the ESDP, especially those immediate tenants 
of the Prague Capabilities Commitments and the European Headline Goal 2010.  
As Lord Robertson pointed out, NATO's value as a strategic asset will ultimately 
depend on three things: capabilities, capabilities, capabilities.251 
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